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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
"The law of defamation aims at the protection of a person's reputation." This 
definition was found in the Canadian, the South African as well as rin the German 
law. 1 However, the question that arises is whether the law of defamation only 
protects the reputation and the good name of a person. Defamation can affect an 
individual's personality with all its aspects such as reputation, dignity or privacy. 
One can think of a broad range of possible violations. 
Due to the broad concept of the law of defamation, this article can only focus on the 
civil law of defamation and will analyse some specific legal problems that arise in all 
of the aforementioned legal systems. Therefore, the thesis begins with an analysis of 
the ambit of the law of defamation in the three different legal systems and examines 
the similarities and the differences. The second chapter deals with the problem of the 
title to sue in a defamation action. Not only living persons can be the target of 
defamatory words and conduct but also deceased person as well as legal entities. 
What parties have a right to sue for compensation in the aforementioned legal systems 
will be analysed. The third chapter illustrates under which circumstances a person will 
be held liable in a defamation action. Here, some major differences between the three 
legal systems are presented. In the fourth chapter the criteria of defamatory words 
and conduct, which are required in the Canadian, the South African and the German 
law, are examined and it is demonstrated how the different legal systems deal with the 
difficult problem of defining a defamatory action. After examining the different 
criteria for a successful action of defamation, the article goes on to compare the 
different defences that a defendant can raise under the three different legal systems. 
Eventually, the issue of compensation in an action for defamation arises. Therefore, 
the last chapter analyses what kind of damages the plaintiff can claim in an action for 
defamation and makes clear that major differences exist between the three legal 
systems. 
1 Burchell 'The Law of Defamation in South Africa' (1985) p.1; Brown 'The Law of Defamation in 
Canada' Vol. I (1987) p.9; Thomas in Palandt ~erliches Gesetzbuch' 58th edition (1999) par.823 
p.178 
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2.0 THE PURPOSE AND THE SCOPE OF THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 
2.1 The protection of the reputation under Canadian and South African law 
In both the South African and the Canadian legal systems, the law of defamation 
seeks to protect an individual's right to an unimpaired reputation or good name. 2 The 
individual's reputation is the one that the person actually enjoys not that which he 
deserves. It reflects the estimation which the person has in the eyes of the society. 
Thus, an impairment of reputation constitutes a lowering of the individual's position 
in the estimation of others. 3 
In both the Canadian and the South African legal system the law of defamation is 
regarded as a part of the law of delict. 4 
Under South African law the reputation of a person is protected under the framework 
of the actio iniuriarum which applies to non-patrimonial loss. 5 The actio injuriarum 
under South African law is a general remedy for violations of personality rights. It 
covers the three fields_ of impairments of reputation, which are the law of defamation, 
thejmpairment of dignity including invasions of privacy~nd _unlawful arrest_and the 
im2airm.cent_of p_erson.6 Under South African law the term ~'d_ignity" is defined as 
')elf-esteem." Its protection is guaranteed by_~ l_Q q_f the South African Bill of Rights, , 
which states that "everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
r~spected and protected." Reputation, as opposed to ~ignity, connotes the estimation, 
of others.7 The law of defamation is only aiming at the protection of the reputation of:' 
~_person. It does not cover the protection of a person's dignity, including violations1 
qf privacy because the latter is a different branch of the actio injuriarum._A.lth_Qugh 
_both notions are clearly distinguished in their definition, South African courts 
s2_1!1.etimes do _not dJa~ '!- cl~ar di_stinction. In Buthelezi v. South Aji'ican Broadcasting 
Corporation, for instance, the court raised the question "why an invasion of a 
2 Burchell 'Defamation' supra p. l; Brown supra p.9; 
3 Burchell 'Defamation' supra p.18 
4 Kinghorn in Joubert/Hanns/Wessel 'The Law of South Africa' Vol.7 'Defamation' (1995) p.225; 
Brown supra p.6 
5 Burchell 'Defamation' supra p.18; Kinghorn supra p.225 
6 Burchell 'Personality rights and freedom of expression - The modem Actio Injuriarum' (1998) p.133 
7 Burchell 'Personality rights' p.329 
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person's right to dignity and reputation should be treated differently because both 
rights are one of the individual's fundamental rights."8 In Holomisa v. Argus 
Newspapers Ltd., Judge Cameron defined the notion of "reputation" as "integral to the 
essential dignity and worth of every human being."9 He continued to state that the 
right of dignity must include the right to a good name and reputation. 10 The Supreme 
Court of Appeal in National Media Ltd v. Bogoshi confirmed this judgment by 
stating that the right to dignity encompasses the right to a good name and also the 
~g~~ t9 a good repu~~1ti~n 11 These decisions show that both rights are closely related 
to each other. _A clear di_stinctjon between dignity on the one hand an.9Jeputation on 
the other is difficult to draw. 
In the Canadian law, as with the South African law, the law of defamation 
encompasses both the protection of a person's reputation and the protection of his 
good name. The right of dignity and the right of privacy are protected by related torts, 
although the law of defamation sometimes overlaps with the invasion of privacy or 
dignity at various points. 12 
2.2 The "general right of personality" under German law 
In the German law the distinction between a person's reputation, on the one hand, and 
his dignity or privacy, on the other hand, is not clearly drawn. The reputation and the 
good name of a person are protected by par. 823 of the German Civil Code (BGB), 
subsection 1, which covers the general right to one's personality as an "other right. "13 
Par. 823 BGB, subsection 1, states that 
"a person who, wilfully or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, 
health, freedom, property or any other right of another is bound to 
compensate him for any damages arising therefrom". 14 
8 Buthelezi v. South African Broadcasting Corporation (1998) 1 B All SA p.147 at p.156 
9 Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers Ltd. (1996) (2) SA p.588 at p.611 
10 Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers Ltd. supra p 607 
11 National lvfedia Ltd v. Bogoshi (1998) (4) SA (SCA) p.1196 at p.1216 
12 Williams 'The Law of Defamation in Canada' (1976) p.28 
13 Schwerdtner in 'iv1uenchener Kommentar zum BGB' Band 1 Allgemeiner Teil par. 12 Rz.164 
14 Par.323, _subsection 1, Gennan Civil Code 
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The right to one's own personality protected under par. 823 of the BGB was first 
introduced by the BGH in the Letters from readers case in 1954. 15 In this case the 
defendant company published an article in its weekly journal in 1952. The article 
concerned the establishment of a new bank called "Bank for Foreign Trade" founded 
by Mr. Schacht who had been Economics Minister under the Nazi regime during the 
Second World War. In order to challenge these allegations the plaintiff, the attorney 
of Schacht who acted on his behalf, sent a letter to the publisher in which he claimed 
that the allegations made in the article were incorrect and needed to be corrected. The 
defendant, instead of issuing a correction, published the letter of the attorney along 
with other letters on the same issue in the following edition under the heading "Letters 
from Readers" .16 This publication made it appear that the attorney had taken a 
personal stand in the matter. Schacht' s lawyer argued that the publication of the letter 
in the journal violated his right of personality. He wrote the letter in his capacity as 
an attorney and the letter was not meant to be published, particularly not in the 
context in which it was. The court acknowledged a general right to "free 
development of the personality" under par. 823 of the BGB as a right to be universally 
respected. This means that the general right of personality functions as an absolute 
right which can be asserted against everyone and which can be violated by everyone 
The Court pointed out that this right flowed from the German Basic Law, particularly 
from art. 1 and art. 2, subsection 1. 17 Art. 1, subsection 1, provides that the "dignity 
of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all public 
authority." Art. 2, subsection 1, states that "everybody has the right to self-fulfilment 
in so far as they do not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional 
order or morality." Art. 1, subsection 1, declares that "the following basic rights shall 
bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable law." All 
of these provisions have an impact on the interpretation of the civil law and create the 
right to one's own personality protected under the term "other right" in par. 823, 
subsection 1 BGB. From this right the court follows that the plaintiff is entitled to 
decide whether his letter is made public. In publishing the letter under the rubric 
"Letters of the Readers" the readers are able to draw conclusions about the plaintiffs 
15 BGHZ 13, 334, 338 
16 BGHZ 13, 334, 341 
17 BGHZ 13,334,339: Markesinis 'A Comparative Introduction to the Gennan Law of Torts' 3rd 
edition (1994) p.59 
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personality. The unauthorised publication does not only constitute an infringement of 
the plaintiffs right of secrecy, it also leads to a violation of the author's protected 
right of personality. This is because the publication of the letter, without the author's 
consent, may spread a false picture of his personality. 18 Consequently, the court 
ordered the defendant to correct the misleading impression which was created in 
publishing the letter of the plaintiff under the rubric "Letters from the Readers." 
However, the right to one's own personality is not exclusively protected by the 
provision of par. 823, subsection 1 of the BGB. Other provisions also cover special 
aspects of the human personality. Par. 12 of the BGB, for instance, protects the 
human name. The provision of par. 824 of the BGB can give rise to a civil action 
against a person who publishes wrong facts which calculate to endanger the credit of 
another person and which the publisher knows or should know are false. Under par. 
826 BGB a person who wilfully causes damages to another person in a "manner 
contra bonos mores" has to pay compensation. Par. 12 to 14 of the Copyright Act 
(Urhebergesetz) provides protection for the dignity and the personality of an author. 
Par. 22 ff of the Act on Artistic Creations (Kunsturhebergesetz) prohibits the 
publication of a person's picture without his consent unless he is a public figure. 
Finally, the crime of insult or slander according to par. 185 of the German Criminal 
Code can be used in combination with par. 823, subsection 2, BGB to claim damages 
in an action for defamation. Due to the fact that all of these aforementioned statutes 
protect special aspects of the human personality, these provisions are called "special 
personality rights" ("besondere Persoenlichkeitsrechte"). These provisions have to 
be distinguished from the general personality right pursuant to par. 823 BGB that 
covers all general aspects of the human personality and dignity and have held primary 
consideration in a defamation case. 
2.3 Comparative Conclusion 
The comparison between the South African law on the one hand and the German law 
on the other demonstrates that the scope of the law of defamation under the German 
law is broader. The general right to one's personality according to par. 823 of the 
18 BGHZ 13, 334, 339-341 
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BGB not only comprises the protection of the reputation and the good name as in the 
Canadian and the South African legal systems, it also protects a person's dignity and 
honour and guarantees a general right of privacy. Thus, the German law of 
defamation focuses on the protection of an individual's personality with all of the 
aspects inherent to a human being's personality such as honour, dignity and privacy. 
In contrast, the law of defamation in both the Canadian and the South African legal 
systems only aims at the protection of the reputation leaving other aspects of a 
human's personality such as dignity to be protected by related torts as in the Canadian 
system. This narrow approach might cause difficulties because it is sometimes 
difficult to distinguish dignity, for instance, from the reputation of a person. It 
frequently occurs that in a defamation action a person's dignity is also affected in a 
case where his reputation is harmed. The fact that various aspects of the human 
personality are closely related to each other was recognised by the South African 
Supreme Court in the case of National Media v. Ltd v. Bogoshi. In this case the court 
decided that dignity encompass the reputation of a person. This approach comes close 
to the German law and should be followed. Personality, like privacy, 1s a vague, 
elusive, essentially non-legal concept that covers any human aspect. Its various 
elements are difficult to separate. The best protection can only be guaranteed if the 
legal system understands this broad concept and tries to provide a system of 
protection that covers the human's personality with all its aspects. 
3.0 TITLE TO SUE 
After having examined the ambit of the law of defamation under the three different 
legal systems, a question arises as to who has a title _.!Q_ su~ for damages in a 
defamation action. A defamatory statement may concern an individual as well as a 
L__ --- - --~ - ·-- .4, __ -
l~a!_ ~~~!i!Y- ·with regard to illdividuals the defamatory statement may affect a living 
person_~-~ well as a deceased person. This chapter analyses the ways in which the 
Canadian, the South African and the German legal systems recognise a title to sue for 
all of the aforementioned persons and entities. 
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3.1 Defamation of individuals 
In Canada, natural persons have a title to sue in an action for defamation. Because 
defamation is regarded as being of a personal nature, the Canadian law only 
recognises a title to sue for living people. 19 Thus, it is not actionable when a person 
publishes a defamatory statement about a deceased person. However, this rule does 
not apply if the imputation against the deceased person reflects upon the living. 20 
This is the case, for instance, if someone insults the deceased as a "whore" which may 




efamatory statements directed towards a class of persons may amount to defamation 
\ c_:>f a particular individual only if the words can be reasonably understood to single this 
/ indiJidual p_~rson out.21 . 
As with the Canadian legal system, the South African legal system recognises the 
right for all natural persons to sue in their own capacity for impairment of their 
reputations. 22 In the case of a "group defamation", the plaintiff similarly has to show 
that the words concerned him personally. The action of the plaintiff will only be 
successful if he can prove that the statement which is related to a group of which he is 
a member concerns in fact him personally. 23 
With regard to defamation of a deceased person, the South African law is similar to 
the Canadian law. 1;:he South African law does not recognise a clajm for d_efii_mati9n_ 
f2r decea~_~4_persons. __ This principle was laid down in the leading case of Spend[tf v. 
East London Daily Despatch Ltd. 24 In this case the defendant newspaper had called a 
deceased ,person a "murderer". The widow and the son of the dead person sued the 
newspaper in a defamation action. The court decided that the son is not entitled to sue 
for injuries done to his father's reputation even if the son feels disparaged by the fact 
that his father has been called a "murderer". A relatiye of <1 d~c~a_seg person llas _n9 __ 
right to claim for damages unless "he himself (th~ sqn)_ was clj!_~ctly_ r_~ferred__!Q _and_ 
19 Brown supra p.821 
20 Linden 'Canadian Tort. Law' 3rd edition (1982) p.685 
21 Brown supra p.218 
22 Burchell 'Defamation' supra p.39 
23 Burchell 'Personality rights' supra p.198 
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the false statement concermng his father was therefore an actual attack upon 
--·-
hims~lf~5 This decisiQn is in accordance with the principle that the actio injuriarum 
is not transmissible neitµer actively nor passively. 26 
Despite the clear statement in Spendiff v. East London Daily Despatch Ltd. it is 
sometimes suggested that the dignity or privacy of a deceased person should be 
protected 27 A British newspaper, for instance, published a picture of the actor David 
Niven just before he died of a muscle-wasting disease. For some authors this 
publication has the same effect to the actor's privacy and dignity no matter if he is 
still alive or already deceased. 28 
Under German law - as under the South African and the Canadian legal systems -
every natural person is entitled to sue for damages in an action for defamation. Even 
individuals who are charged with a criminal offence or are already convicted can 
assert this right. The German law also extends the protection of the personality right 
to children no matter if the child is - due to his age - aware of the violation of his 
d. · 29 1gmty. 
Unlike the South African and the Canadian legal systems the German legal system 
allows a group to claim damages in a defamation action under special circumstances. 
In order to have a successful claim it is required that the defamatory statement 
concern a group which can be clearly distinguished from the general public by special 
characteristics such as the profession or the race.30 Examples are the insult of a group 
like "the police", "the soldiers" or "the Jews." If this requirement is met the specific 
group of people has a title to sue for defamation. 
Regarding the protection of the reputation of deceased persons the German system is 
different to the Canadian and the South African legal systems. German comts and 
also legal writers generally recognise a right of personality to person after their death. 
24 Spendiffv. EastLondon Daily De::.patch Ltd (1929) EDL p.113 
25 Spendiff v. East London Daily De::.patch Ltd supra p.131 
26 Burchell 'Defamation' supra p.137 
27 Burchell 'Personality rights' supra p.202-203 
28 Burchell 'Personality rights' supra p.203 
29 Schwerdtner supra par.12 Rz.205 
30 Schwerdtner supra par. I Rz.206 
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This is known as "postmortaler Persoenlichkeitsschutz."31 This right "postmortem" is 
based on the consideration that a sufficient protection of the development of dignity 
and personality is only achieved under the German Basic Law if the individual's 
personality is not defamed after they have died. In other words, a person must be sure 
that the personal image that he has established during his life remains untouchable 
after his death. 
The leading case in which the BGH recognised the personality right "postmortem" 
was the Mephisto case. This case concerned a novel called "Mephisto - Roman einer 
Karriere" written by the author Klaus Mann. The novel described the life and the 
career of the actor and director Gustav Gruendgens. Gruendgens played a major role 
during the Second World War as a supporter of the Nazi regime. Although Mann did 
not use Gruendgens' real name, it was without doubt for the public that he referred to 
Gruendgens. The author committed suicide in 1949 and Gruendgens also died. 
Shortly after the novel was published in Germany, Gruendgens' adopted son sued the 
editor of Mann's novel in an action for defamation. 32 
The Court confirmed the existence of a personality right "postmortem." It argued that 
the people who read the novel will remember Gruendgens as he was described in it, 
namely as the great Nazi supporter and Gruendgens is not able to challenge this image 
presented by Mann in the novel. The need for protection therefore endures long after 
a person has died. This right is based on art. 1 and 2 of the German Basic Law. 
However, the Court pointed out that a deceased person is only protected against 
serious defamation of his personality or dignity. 33 In other words, the violation of the 
reputation must be serious to the extent that his image established during his lifetime 
is completely disparaged. The persons who are entitled to claim damages on behalf of 
the deceased person are the closest relatives. 34 
31 Gamm 'Persoenlichkeitsschutz m1d Massenmcdien' NJW 1979, p.513 at p.517 
32 BGH NJW 1968, 1773 
33 BGH_NJW 1968, 1773, 1777 
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3.2 Defamation of a non-natural person 
In the Canadian legal system, along with individuals, certain legal entities such as 
associations, corporations or other cohesive groups, also have a title to sue in an 
action for defamation. In order to have a successful claim the defamatory statement 
must reflect upon the reputation of the entity and must affect its reputation in a 
material respect.35 The reputation of an entity is limited by its nature, for instance, a 
trading corporation has a "trading" reputation, a local government corporation has a 
"governing" reputation. The general test is that the sting of the defamatory statement 
must refer to the "business character" of the entity and not to the individuals 
associated with it. 36 Thus, a corporation may sue for damage to its business interests 
or goodwill by false imputations of insolvency, inefficiency or impropriety in the 
conduct of its affairs. 37 Unincorporated associations, other than partnerships, trade 
unions and employer's associations, do not have the legal status to sue in their own 
right. The members of these associations have a title to sue only if they can prove that 
the words complained of refer to them as individuals. 38 
As with t~ Canadian legal system, ,!!le South African legal system also recognises the 
rjgJ;t__fo~ trading_£Orp.9_!~!iQns_to sue for defam_<!!i9n p1~oyid_~d tha!__!he defam~t_ory 
~t~~eme~t ~as intended to _impair its business rep_utation.~9 This principle was laid 
down in the landmark decision of Fichardt Ltd v. The Friend Newspapers Ltd In 
this case the Friend Newspaper published an article in which the plaintiff, a trading 
corporation running a business in Bloemfontein during the First World War, was 
alleged to be a German place of business. Although the Appellate Division stated that 
the publication could not be considered defamatory, it discussed the issue of whether 
the plaintiff as a trading corporation has a title to sue for defamation. 40 The Court 
decided that a corporation does not need to prove actual damage. The suing 
corporation must rather show that the defamatory statement was calculated to "injure 
34 Staudinger 'Kommentar zum BGB' (Band 1 par.1-12) 13th edition (1995) Vorbem. zu par. I Rz.30 
35 Williams supra p.22 
36 Linden supra p.685 
37 Linden supra p.685 
38 Linden supra p.686 
39 Kinghorn supra p.234 
4° Fichardt Ltd. v. 771e Friend Newspapers Ltd. (1916) AD. p.1 at p.6 
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the business reputation of the corporation or to affect the trade or business which it 
was established to carry on."41 
More controversial was the issue of whether or not a non-trading corporation 1s 
entitled to sue for injury to its reputation. 42 In earlier decisions it was stated that such 
corporations should not have a title to sue in a defamation action because these 
corporations have no business and therefore no personal reputation to protect.43 This 
view has been criticised with the argument that if a statement is calculated to 
prejudice a non-trading corporation in carrying out the purpose for which it has been 
established, such statement must be considered defamatory. 44 The Appellate Division 
in Dhlomo NO v. Natal Newspapers Ltd terminated this dispute when it decided that 
non-trading corporations are entitled to sue for defamation)f they are calculated to 
i .~-· 
suffer financial prejudice_ and where "appropriate circumstances" so dictate.45 The 
Court stressed that non-trading corporations also depend on financial support from the 
public. Therefore they are as vulnerable in terms of defamatory statements about the 
matter in which they conduct their affairs as trading corporations are. It would be 
thus "illogical and unfair" to deny such a corporation the right to sue for defamation. 46 
The non-trading corporation can therefore sue for compensation in a defamation 
action. It is not required that the corporation prove the existence of special 
damages. 47 
However, the court pointed out that not every non-trading corporation has the title to 
sue in an action for defamation. A political party, for instance, may not be entitled to 
recover damages for an impairment of its reputation. The principle of freedom of 
political debate requires that statements in a political discussion can be made without 
fearing legal consequences. 48 The issue of a political party's right to sue in an action 
for defamation was picked up in Argus Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Inkatha 
41 Fichardt Ltd. v. The Friend Newspapers Ltd. supra p.6 
42 Kinghorn supra p.234; Amerasinghe 'Defamation and other aspects of the Actio Iniuriarum in 
Roman-Dutch Law' (1968) p.46 
43 Bhika v. Prema (1910) T.S. p.101; Die Spoorbondv. SouthAJhcan Railways (1946) A.D. p.999 at 
p.1011 
44 Amerasinghe supra p.46 
45 Dhlomo NO v. Natal l'-lew:,papers Ltd. (1989) (1) SA (A.D.) p.945 at p.954; Grogan/Midgley 
'Corporate Reputation and Title to Sue' (1989) SAL[ vol.106 p.587 at p.589 
46 Dhlomo NO v. Natal Newspapers Ltd. supra p.954 
47 Kinghorn supra p.234 
48 Dhlomo NO v. Natal Newspapers Ltd supra p.954 
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Freedom Party. Contrary to the decision in Dhlomo NO v. Natal Newspapers Ltd., 
the court reached the conclusion that political parties have the same right as other 
non-trading corporations to sue for damages in response to statements calculated to 
cause them pecuniary loss. The court applied the same limits to political parties as it 
applied to other non-trading entities. 49 However, it pointed out that in determining of 
whether or not a political party has the title to sue, it always has to take into account 
the policy need for free political debate. 50 
As in the Canadian legal system, unincorporated associations do not have the legal 
status to sue for damages in a defamation action. Only their members are entitled to 
sue and that is if they can show that the statement complained of refers to them. 51 
Under German law non-natural entities are also entitled to sue in an action for 
defamation. The general test is whether the defamatory remark refers to the business 
character of the non-natural person. The protection is therefore limited to those cases 
in which defamatory statements concern the business' reputation. 52 The legal entities 
which enjoy this protection, are corporations, partnerships ("Personengesellschaften 
des Handelsrecht"), associations ("Vereine") and also political parties. 53 
3.3 Comparative Conclusion 
Regarding the title to sue m an action for defamation, a lot of similarities exist 
between the three different legal systems. All three legal systems recognise the right 
to sue for individuals. The only difference can be seen in the fact that the German law 
acknowledges a right to sue in a defamation action for groups whereas the South 
African and the Canadian legal systems do not allow groups to claim damages in a 
defamation action. In the two latter legal systems an action is only successful if the 
individual proves that the defamatory statement, which refers to a group, also 
concerns him personally. 
49 Argus Printing and Publishing Co. Lid. v. Jnkatha Freedom Party (1992) (3) SA p.579 at p.589 
50 Argus Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd v. Inkatha Freedom Party supra p.585 
51 Kinghorn supra p.234 
52 Staudinger supra Vorbem. zu par.I Rz..30 
53 Palandt supra par. 823 Rz.181,182 
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Moreover, all three legal systems recognise a title to sue for legal entities. They all 
provide the same requirement for a non-natural entity to sue in an action for 
defamation. The defamatory remark must be related to the business character or 
reputation and not to a member or the individual representing the legal entity. In 
---ot-::-h_e_r _w_o_r--:d:--s,-t'.':'h_e_s""."t-at:-e-m_e_n-:-t _c_o_m-p7la--:-in_e_d-;--o-;::-f-m_u_s:--t-a-::ffi~e-c:--t "".'.th;-e--:-tr-a-;-d-e_o_r_t,.....:fi_e_,o,_u-si'fie"ss in 
which the legal entity is involved. Furthermore, all three legal systems also recognise 
a right to sue for non-trading entities and political parties . 
• 
The only major difference between the legal systems is in regards to the defamation of 
deceased persons. In contrast to the German law neither the Canadian nor the South 
African law acknowledges a right of personality "postmortem." The only exception 
they make is in the case of a defamatory statement that concerns a deceased person 
reflects upon the living, particularly the relatives of the dead person. Only if the 
family members can prove that the defamatory imputation violates their reputation 
will they have a title to sue. 
This principle, confirmed by both Canadian and South African courts, implies that the 
personality with all its aspects such as dignity and reputation ends with the death of 
the person. However, this view is questionable. As the German court in the Mephisto 
case made clear, a person's personality does not end with his or her death. This is 
because the person, particularly public figures or celebrities, remain in the memory of 
others after their death. A person who has passed away has established a special 
personal image during his lifetime, which is protected under the Constitution This 
person has a legitimate interest in keeping his image of personality even after his 
death. Neither the German nor the South African or Canadian Constitutions provide 
that the right of personality or dignity only apply to living people. Consequently, 
there is a need for a deceased person to be protected against serious violations of their 
personality. Especially in cases where the violation tends to disparage completely 
one's reputation or the image established during a person's lifetime. Therefore, it can 




This chapter about liability examines under which circumstances a person is liable in 
a defamation action. Through this analysis it is clear that major differences exist 
between the three different legal systems. 
4.1 Defamation as a strict liability tort in the Canadian legal system 
In the Canadian law, defamation is a strict liability tort. That means that the law of 
defamation imposes liability regardless of the fault of the defendant. 54 Even if the 
defendant does not intend to make a defamatory statement which disparages another 
person's reputation he will be held liable. The publication of a defamatory statement 
alone is actionable. The rule that liability is imposed regardless of the intention of the 
defendant was demonstrated in the case of Cassidy v. Daily Ji.1irror Newspaper Ltd. 55 
In this case the newspaper published a picture of Cassidy posing with a woman to 
whom he said he was engaged. The picture, which shows Cassidy together with the 
woman, underlined this statement. In reality, he was married to the plaintiff who sued 
· the newspaper agency successfully in a defamation action. The court rejected the 
defendant's argument that the newspaper agency had no intention of defaming 
Cassidy with the picture. In fact, the agency did not even know that it was making a 
statement about him. 56 The court held that the intention of the publisher is irrelevant. 
Consequently, liability is imposed regardless of an intention to disparage another 
person's reputation on the pa1t of the defendant. 57 
However, Canadian courts have occasionally departed from the rule of strict liability. 
In Hein v. Canadian Fairbanks Morse Co. the defendant sent a letter to a third party 
in which he stated that the plaintiff had sold a "used" water plant to this person though 
the plaintiff had sold it as "new."58 The court held that the defendant was not liable 
unless he "knew or ought to have known the letter would be understood by those to 
54 Williams supra p.5 
55 Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspaper Ltd. (1929) 2 K.B. p. 331 (C.A) reprinted in Brown suprn p.25 
56 Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspaper Ltd. supra p.25 
57 Cassidy v. Dai~y lvfirror Newspaper Ltd. supra p.25 
58 Hein v. Canadian Fairbanks Morse Co. (1938) 13 M.P.R. p 255 
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whom it was published in a libellous sense."59 Similarly, in Grant v. Simpson, Judge 
Smith could not understand how a person could be held liable for a meaning "resting 
upon knowledge to which the defendant was not privy."60 Despite the critiques of 
these judgements, the majority of Canadian courts still apply the strict liability rule. 
4.2 The element of animus injuriandi in the South African legal system 
Unlike in the Canadian legal system the law of defamation under South African law is 
not a strict liability tort. Rat,hfil, defamation requires an element of animus injuriandi, 
.gthenyis.e.Jm.own as conscious intention. 61 This requirement of the element of fault is 
one of the major differences between the South African and the Canadian legal 
systems. The requirement is recognised as an essential element of a defamation 
action and its establishment has been part of long juridical process and discussion. 62 
One of the most crucial cases in which the principle of animus injuriandi in an action 
of defamation was laid down is the case of South Afi·ican Broadcasting Corporation 
v. 0 'Malley, decided by the Appellate Decision. The court defined the criterion of 
fault as the subjective intention to injure the reputation of a person with knowledge or 
at least foresight of the unlawfulness of the publication.63 Intention includes all forms. 
of dolus, as it is known in the criminal law such as dolus directus, dolus indirectus and 
dolus eventualis. 64 Negligence is therefore insufficient to cause liability in an action 
for defamation. 
However, for a great length of legal history, the South African law made a remarkable 
exception to the application of the fault element. Concetning_ the m~di11 including 
print media, television and ~~~io _i! ~p_pli~~ !~e ~tric!)iability rule as in the Canadian 
law. Qefamation throµgh _th_e m.:Lss media kltp.QUf.lted tJ_i.er~foi:_e_~9 _ _sJrict liab_ility. 65 This 
principle was recognised in the leading case of South African __ l}_!._Qadcasting 
Corporation v. 0 'Malley. In this case the plaintiff stated in a news repoti_Jhat the 
defendant, an editor of a daily newspaper, had attended an unlawful gathering and 
59 Hein v. Canadian Fairbank:n\;forse Co. supra p.264 
60 Grantv. Simpson (1878) 12 N.S.R. p.145 
61 MacMillan 'Animus injuriandi and privilege' (1975) Vol.92 _$ALJ p.144 
62 Ibid; Arnerasinghe suprJ p.8; Ncethling/Potgieter/Visser 'Law ofDelict' 2nd edition (1994) p.327 
63 South African Broadcasting Corporation v. 0 '.A;fa/ley (1977) (3) SA (AD) p.606 at p.613 
64 Kinghorn supra p.226 
65 Kok 'The Elements oflnjuria' (1985) vol.102 SAIJ p.388 at p.392 
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been arrested on a charge of having done so. In reality, th~ defendant had been 
arrested at a wine tasting contest at a hotel in connection with an advertisement for the 
prohibited gathering, which had appeared in his newspaper. 66 The South African 
Broadcasting Corporation argued that the report was true and correct in every respect, 
that it had been published without animus injuriandi towards O'Malley and in the 
~11tere~t_ gf the general public. 67 The <;ourt rejected this_ argument and_p_ointed_outthat 
the liability of the press is not based on fault but is strict.:_68 It argued that the ~outh_ 
African law is closely related to the English law where liability for the press is based 
~!1- the publication of defamatory material and is dependent on any particular 
i_?Jention. The reason for strict liability is according to the Court the need to protect 
the ordinary citizen _ against the powerful media and its potential for injuring a 
_citizen's rep~tation. ~n these situations it may be difficult to pinpoint the intention of 
~- parti~ular person. Tbe average intelligent listener to the radio has only one 
o_pportunity to hear a story and so the first impression will remain. _At!other policy 
reason for holding the press strict liable is that the intention on the part Qf the persons 
i~volved is difficult to prove.69 In applying these principles to the case in question the 
Court held that a reasonable listener would in fact gain the impression after listening 
to the news report that O'Malley had participated in a prohibited meeting.70 In 
accordance with the English law the court decided that the principle of strict liability 
should be applied to the owners, editors, publishers and printers of newspapers. The 
only exception that was made was for distributors. }Jews distributors qu1 ~s<;:,ape 
liability for defamation on the ground of lack of neglig~Qce71 
In Pakendorf v. De Flamingh the Appellate Division confirmed the principle of strict 
liability for the press laid down in South African Broadcasting C01poration v. 
0 'Malley. It held that the owner, publisher, printer or editor of a newspaper may be 
held strict liable even if they did not int~mi to_defi1mea per~_on.72 Absence otanjmus 
i~juri~~i is therefore not a valid defence for the press. In accordance with the 
decision in South African Broadcasting v. 0 'Malley it was held that only distributors 
66 South Afi-ican Broadcasting Corporation v. 0 'Malley (1977) (3) SA (AD) p.606 at p.607 
67 South African Broadcasting Corporation v. 0 'Malley supra p.607 
68 South African Broadcasting Corporation v. 0 ?vfalley supra p.612 
69 South African Broadcasting Corporation v. 0 'Malley supra p.613 
70 South African Broadcasting Corporation v. 0 'Malley supra p.617; Burchell 'The Fault Element in 
the Law of Defamation' (1978) vol.9;'i SALJ p.170 at p.172 
71 South African Broadcasting Corporation v. 0 'Malley supra p.615 
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might be excepted from the strict liability principle if they show that they were not 
aware of the defamatory meaning of the statement. However, the Court stressed that 
the press can always rely on the defences which exclude unlawfulness __ ~ven wh~re 
~rjct _li.<tbility exists. 73 
The decision in Pakendorf v. De Flamingh was overruled by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in the case of National Media Ltd v. Bogoshi.14 In this case the owner, 
publisher, editor, distributor and printer of the City Press had been sued by the 
respondent for damages arising from the publication of a series of allegedly 
defamatory articles published in the newspaper between 1991 and 1994. One of the 
major arguments of the appellants was that the articles had been published without 
animus injuriandi and consequently the publication had been lawful. 
The Supreme Court expressly reasoned that the judgement of Pakendmf v. De 
Flamingh confirming the principle of strict liability for the press was wrong. For the 
integrity of the common law the press __ should be_ treC:1t~d Jike or9im11-y_indjviduals, 
J...----- - ... - ------ --·- - -- -
which means that members of the press can escape liability in p_royjngJhat they did 
not_ act_ intentionally.?~ _ The Court based this decision basically on two major 
arguments. First, it pointed to the crucial role of the _c~!-l_stitutional right o_f freedom of 
expression and_ spee~h. Freedom of expression including th~- medja freedom 
constitutes one of the essential foundations of _a democratic society. 76 A truly 
democratic system is best served by the free flow of information, particularly 
P!ov_ide_? by the pre_ss. _In holding t~e press strictly liable in an action for defamation 
this constitutional right is not given the attention it requires. The stereotyped defences 
such as truth and public benefit, fair comment and qualified privilege do not provide 
appropriate protection for the freedom of the pre~s. Secondly, the Court stressed that 
the media has an essential function to inform the public about every aspect of public, 
political, social and economic incidents. Thus, the press contributes to the formation 
\... -· . . . 
of the p_u_blic opini(!n__ on the basis of their duty to _i11form ~nd the pu~lic' s right to 
72 Pakendorfv. De Flamingh (1982) (3) SA (AD) p.146 at p.157 
73 Pakendorfv. De Flamingh supra p. 156 
74 National Media Ltd v. Bogoshi (1998) (4) SA (SCA) p.1196 at p.1211 
75 National Media Ltd v. Bogoshi supra p.1202 
76 National Media Ltd v. Bogoshi supra p.1207 
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gather information. 77 In providing useful and sometimes vital inform~t_i()n_about the 
d~ily affairs of the nation to citizens, the pres~_ Q_~~n !akes Qt_Lth_e rol~_Qf_the _voice of 
the people. Due to this crucial role of the media it is clear :that strict Jiability__c.ann.ot c_ - . 
be defended any longer and should therefore be rejected. 78 
_.£, (\J (< 
In sum, it can ~~ ~.iW that the principle of strict liability f~r the e~ss, according to th~ ~- :-:==-
Supreme Court in National Media Ltd v. Bogoshi, is no longer valid. The element of 
gtult is required not only for ordinary individuals but also fo_i: t~e med~a. 
4.3 The fault element in the German legal system 
The law of defamation under German law is not a strict liability tort. In this way, the 
German law is similar to the South African law and different from the Canadian law. 
Par. 823, subsection 1 of the BGB expressly protects the personality right against 
wilful or negligent violations. Intention encompass the forms of dolus directus, dolus 
indirectus and dolus eventualis. Negligence is defined as the failure to act according 
to the diligence which is required by the special situation.79 In the majority of cases 
the acts will be intentional or at least reckless. In other cases, especially those in 
which the plaintiff is placed in a false light in the public eye as by incorrect statements 
in a newspaper report, the defendant's conduct is regarded as negligent. 80 
The special personality rights such as par. 824 and 826 BGB, par. 22 ff of the Act on 
Artistic Creations and par. 12 to 14 of the Copyright Act also require a fault element. 
Par. 823, subsection 2 BGB applies to statutory provisions, which intend to protect 
others. These protective laws contain the provisions of the German Criminal Code, 
which also require a wilful or negligent action. Even if the protective law itself 
allows a violation of the statutes without fault, par. 823, subsection 2 BGB makes 
clear that "the duty to make compensation only arises if some fault can be imputed to 
the wrongdoer." 
77 National Media Ltd. v. Bogoshi supra p.1209 
78 National Media Ltd v. Bogoshi supra p.1208 
79 Palandt supra par. 823 Rz. 197 
80 Handford 'Moral Damage in Gennany' (1978) ICLO Vol.27, p.849 at p.866 
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The German legal system also acknowledges a fault element in cases where the media 
is involved in a defamation action. 81 The editor, for instance, has the legal duty to 
examine critical articles written by his employees for possible violations of 
personality rights of third persons. 82 If he fails to do so, he acts negligently and will 
be held liable. Another example is the famous case of Caterina Valente in which the 
actress claimed for damages in respect to an advertisement for a preparation for a 
false teeth fixing preparation which mentioned her name. The court reasoned that 
mentioning the plaintiffs name without her consent was at least grossly negligent 
because the defendant should have undertaken inquiries as to whether permission had 
been given. 83 Therefore, liability for the press follows the same fault principle as is 
required for defamatory actions committed by "ordinary" people other than members 
of the media. 
4.4 Comparative Conclusion and Discussion 
Both the South African as well as the German legal systems require a fault element in 
order to hold the publisher liable for defamatory imputations. In contrast to these 
legal systems, the Canadian law of defamation is a strict liability tort. However, as it 
has already been stated, some Canadian courts occasionally depa1ied from the strict 
liability rule and these judgements have their justifications. 
St~i_ct liability in a defa!"P-ation action means that the defendant is liable for_ defamatory 
~,emarks, which he could not r~ason_c1_bly_a,nticip_at~,. Even if he did not know the 
person who he defamed he will be held liable under Canadian law. This rule is not in 
accordance with delict principles under German law which require at least negligent 
action in order to impose liability. In a case where the publisher is held strictly liable, 
the only possibility to defend himself is to raise defences. However, it is doubtful that 
the traditional defences given under the Canadian law provide a sufficient protection 
for the publisher. Therefore, the South African and the German solutions, namely to 
link liability to the element of fault, seem to provide a more appropriate protection for 
the publisher. 
81 Palandt supra par. 823 Rz. 197 
82 BGH NJW 1980, 2810 
83 BGHZ 30, 7, 13 
20 
With regard to the liability of the press in a defamation action the South African law 
has undergone major changes. The Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of National 
Media Ltd v. Bogoshi decided that the strict liability rule for the press was no longer 
effective. Like the German law the South African law now requires an element of 
fault when the press publishes a defamatory statement. Although it cannot be denied 
that the media, due to its sometimes powerful position, has the potential to seriously 
injure a person's reputation by spreading out defamatory remarks, this argument 
should not lead to the result that the media is strictly liable in a defamation action. 
There is no legal basis on which to treat the media differently than "ordinary" citizens 
in terms of liability. From a constitutional point of view the media enjoys the same 
protection concerning the freedom of expression or speech as "ordinary" citizens do. 
According to art. 5 of the German Basic Law the freedoms of expression and speech 
also include freedom of the press. S 16 of the South African Bill of Rights 1996 
provides that everyone enjoys freedom of expression, which includes the freedom of 
' - - - -- . - - --
the press a~d-~f th_e other media. 
S!rict liability for the press would further undermine the important r()le of the media 
in providing useful information to the public. In supplying important information the 
press contributes to a democratic system, which demands a free flow of information. 
Thus, the freedom of the press, constitutionally guaranteed, is essential for a 
democratic society. Strict liability would impose undesirable restrictions on the 
Illedia and would therefore endanger the right of freedom of expression. 
GQ_nsequently, the decision in National Media Ltd v. Bogoshi has its justification. 
5.0 CRITERIA OF DEFAMATORY WORDS AND CONDUCT 
This chapter about the criteria of defamatory words and conduct analyses the elements 
of defamation, those which the plaintiff has to allege and prove in order to have a 
successful claim under the three different legal systems. 
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5.1 The legal situation in the Canadian and the South African legal systems 
5.1.1 The ''various test" under Canadian law 
The Canadian legal system does not have a universal test in order to decide whether 
words or conduct are defamato1y. The Canadian courts rather provided several 
different definitions in order to establish defamhtory conduct. One of the most 
frequently used definitions was introduced in the case Paul v. van Hill, decided in 
1962. According to Judge Maybank defamation can be regarded as a "publication 
without justification or lawful excuse, which is calculated to injure the reputation of 
another, by exposing him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule". 84 This definition has 
sometimes been considered too narrow. Thus, the words must cause a person to be 
"shunned or avoided" were added. 85 In Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwin-Mayer 
Pictures Ltd., Judge Scrutton also criticised the definition given in Paul v. van H;/l as 
too narrow.86 He preferred the definition which was also used in Scott v. Sampson 
which states that defamation is "a false statement about a man to his discredit."87 
Another formula which was first developed in the case Sim v. Strech described 
defamation as something that "tends to lower a person in the estimation of right-
thinking members of society generally."88 
5.1.2 The criterion of "unlawfulness" under South African law 
Under South African law defamation is defined as the "unlawful publication, animo 
injuriandi, of a statement concerning another person which has the effect of injuring 
that person in his reputation."89 Thus, the law of defamation is based on two major 
. . 1 c: 1 d r-14\\\jf:\,.,Q__., ,_ d. Th I . . h b crJtena: un aw1u ness ~n -~~u11us 111J~E_t~n __ 1. __ e atter reqmrement - as 1t as een 
already pointed out - is different to the Canadian law in which the law of defamation 
is recognised as a strict liability tort. 
84 Williams supra p.7; Paul v. Van Hull (1962), 36 D.L.R. (2d) reprinted in Solomon/Feldthusen/Mills 
'Cases and Materials on the Law of Torts' (1982) Chapter 28: Defamation p.905 
85 Linden supra p.676 
86 Youssoupojfv. Metro-Goldwin-Mayer Pictures Ltd. (1934), 50 T.L.R p. 584 
87 Youssoupojfv. Metro-Goldwin-Mayer Pictures Ltd. supra p. 584; Scott v. Sampson 8 Q.B.D. p.503 
88 Sim v. Stretch (1936), 52 T.L.R. p.669 
89 Kinghorn supra p.226 
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Unlawfulness can be defined as "impair_~ent cl reputation," that is the infringement 
of_ a legally protected right or interest.90 The Canadian legal system does not 
recognise the term "unlawfulness" in the law of defamation. The criteria to be 
applied, however, are similar. Under both the Canadian and the South African law a 
p~rson' s reputation is injured if the statement tends to lower him in the estin:!ation _of 
right-thinking members of the society. 91 
In order to ascertain what constitutes a "!owering in estimation" the courts have 
decided that imputations against the "moral character or those that_ arou~_e__hatred, 
contempt or ridicule" are defamatory. 92 Defamatory statements can be uttered in 
various situations and consequently there exists a substantial amount of case law in 
South Africa. The statements can affect the moral ~harac!er of a per~on, imputing, for 
~nstance, dishonesty or the commission of a crime, immora.lity__ or_ unchastity. 93 
Furthermore, _defamatory r_emarks can be _relategJ9 s_omeone' s office, profe~siqn or 
occupation94 and they can also impute financial embarrassment,95 The definition does -- - . 
not require that the statement be false. 
In order to determine what a "right-thinking member of the society" thinks, the South 
African Bill of Rights provides guidelines for the society's behaviour and such norms 
and principles will influence the attitude of a 'right-thinking member'. 96 
5.1.3 The defamatory meaning 
The definitions in the Canadian law, described in the preceding section, are abstract 
guidelines, which the courts use as a starting point. In applying these different 
definitions the courts will often address the issue of defamation by asking whether the 
publication has the tendency to injure, disgrace, prejudice or adversely affect the 
reputation or character of the plaintiff. 97 There are many different examples of 
defamatory words and conduct of which only a few can be given. It was held, for 
90 Burchell 'Defamation' supra p.59 
91 Kinghorn supra p.226 
92 Amerasinghe supra p.15; Marruchi v. Harris (1943) OPD p.15 at p.22 
93 De Beerv. De Villiers (1913) CPD p.543 (sexual immorality) 
94 De Graaf and Viljoen v. Viljoen (1916) AD p.539 (director of education) 
95 Borkum v. Cline (1959) (2) SA p.670 
96 Burchell 'Personality rights' supra p.195 
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instance, that it is actionable to call someone a "liar" or a "crook", a "drunk" or a 
"traitor,,98 To impute an unpopular political belief to a person, such as implying that 
he is a Com~unist, can be defamatory as well. 99 An implication _of immoral conduct~ 
c~n also be classified as defamatory. Thus, when someone says that he knew "five 
fellows who took a woman behind the church and screwed her", liability was 
irnposed. 100 To call a doctor a "quack" or a lawyer a "shyster" can also amount to 
- ··- ---- - -·· - --- --
det~mation be~ause it disparages a person's professional capacity. 101 All of these 
examples illustrate that there is no limit to the types of things people can say to each 
othyr, which can be classified as defamatory. ~ 
~"- ·-- .. --
The problem which arises in defamation cases is that words might be understood by 
the reader or listener differently from the meaning intended by the speaker or author. 
w_ ords will, in general, be given thei~ natural and ordinary meaning_ unless they have 
s_ome special, technical or colloquial meaning. _102 In order to be actionable, the court 
examines the defamatory meaning of words by reference to an ordinary, reasonable 
and right-thinking person. In determining the meaning which will be attributed to the 
words, the court will take into account all of the circumstances of the case, including 
any reasonable implication of the words and the context in which the words were 
spoken. It will also take into consideration the ~udience_ for who1? t~~~ords were 
p_uQlis_hed_ a1:1d the manner in which they were presented. 103 
Under South African law the test of whether a particular statement is defamatory is, as 
in the Canadian law, an objective one. The court must determine whether a 
"reasonable man" would have _unde_rsto~d the s~atem~nt as defamatory. 104 In God v. 
Smith t~e reasonable man was defined as a person "of __ norm~J_u!!_derstandjng and _ 
de_velopJl!ent with normal emotional reactions."~05 
97 Brown supra p.40 
98 Linden supra p.677 
99 Dennison v. Sanderson (1946) O.R. p.601 (C.A.) 
10° French (Elizabeth) v. Smith (1923) 3 D.L.R. p.906 
101 Linden supra p.678 
102 Brown supra p.124 
103 Brown supra p.124 
104 Kinghom supra p.230 
105 God v. Smith (1964) (4) S..i:\ p.374 at p.376 
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Furthermore, the words must be interpreted in the context in which it appears. In 
order to interpret the meaning of the words in their context the court must take into 
consideration not only what the statement expressly means but also of what it implies. 
5.1.4 Innuendo 
A different situation might arise where the plaintiff claims that the words complained 
of are defamatory in a sense other than their ordinary meaning. In other wC>rds, he --.. -
- - -- - -- -·- ~---~ 
demonstrates that the words have an extended meaning. This concept of the 
'---- --
·-
extended meaning of a statement is in both the Canadian and the South African legal 
systems known as an "innuendo" .106 
The Canadian law of defamation distinguishes between "popular" or "false" 
innuendoes and "true" or "legal" innuendoes. 107 A "true" or "legal" innuendo arises 
from facts or circumstances, which give the words a special meaning other than their 
natural or ordinary meaning. 108 The special meaning may be deduced from the 
technical nature of the language, the "slang" meaning of the words or because of 
some special knowledge of those to whom the words were spoken. The plaintiff has 
to prove the underlying facts or circumstances and must show that reasonable persons, 
with the special knowledge, would have understood the words in a defamatory 
sense. 109 The court then decides vvhether the words are capable of bearing the 
meaning that the plaintiff ascribes to them. 
"Popular" or "false" innuendoes are meanings attributed to the ordinary and natural 
meaning of words, which arise solely by inference or implication. 110 In contrast to the 
"Jme" or "legal" innuendoes, no fa~ts .. or _ circumstances extrinsic tq_ Jh_e_ wor.:ds 
the_Illselves are required to explain their meaning. Thus, in case of a "false" innuendo 
the plaintiff offers a version to the court of what he or she feels is an appropriate 
interpretation of the words. 111 
106 Amerasinghe supra p.32; Brown supra p.155 
10
; Brown supra p.155 
108 Linden supra p.681 
109 Linden supra p.682 
110 BrO\vn supra p.158 
111 BrO\vn supra p.160 
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The South African law does not recognise the terminus technicus "tme" or "false" 
innuendo. It rather distinguishes a primary and a secondary meaning of the 
defamatory statement. The primary or per se meaning is the ordinary meaning given 
to the statement by a reasonable man. If a statement is per se defamatory the plaintiff 
may rely on an extended meaning in order to point out the sting of the defamation 
This attached meaning is often set out in the form of a paraphrase of the statement and 
is called the "quasi-innuendo". 112 
The secondary meanmg derives other than the ordinary one from special 
circumstances or it can be described as an "unusual meaning" which could be 
attributed to the words by a person having knowledge of special circumstances. 113 
When compared to the Canadian system the secondary meaning of a statement is 
similar to the ''tme" or "legal" innuendo. Like the Canadian law, the South African 
law requires that the plaintiff alleges and proves the secondary meaning of the 
~tatement: In other words, his pleadings must include _an alleg~ti~n-~~-the special 
fircumstances, _,w~ich give the words tha~ seconda~ meaning.~
14 
He t~:n mus! show 
h'<w a reasonable person would understand the words as defamatory in these spe_cial 
circumstances. 
, ·-
5.1.5 Reference to the plaintiff 
Apart from the requirement that the words must _have _a ~efamatory_ m~a_!_!!~g2-._!~~-
p!aintiff must allege and prove tha! the defamat9ry statement complained of 
cog_cer!!_~Q___-~~-f!()th the Canadian as well as the South African law apply this 
principle. 115 In order to be identifiable, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove 
that he was referred to by his or her proper name. It is sufficient to refer to some 
identifiable characteristics or features. In this latter situation the plaintiff has to 
indicate the facts upon which he relies in order to show that the words or conduct 
referred to him personally. 
112 Kinghorn supra p. 231 
113 National Union of Distributive Workers v. Cleghorn & Harris Ltd (1946) A.D. p.984 at p.997 
114 Amerasinghe supra p.32 
115 Williams in Klar 'Studies in Canadian Tort Law' (1977) Chapter 9: Decorum in Defamation p.276; 
Burchell 'Defamation' supra p.128; 
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In order to determine whether the plaintiff is the one who was referred to, both the 
Canadian and the South African legal system apply an objective test. The question is 
whether an ordinary reasonable man to whom the statement was published was likely 
t~ ~nderstand the words complained of as a reference to the plainti!f 116 
The major difference between the Canadian and the South African legal systems is 
that the Canadian law does not require that the defendant intended to refer to the 
plaintiff. 117 Even if the defendant did not know of the existence of the plaintiff and 
therefore could not intend to defame him, he will be held liable. 118 The lack of the 
intention element is based on the fact that the Canadian law of defamation is a strict 
liability tort Consequently, it is not necessary for the defendant to have intended to 
refer to the plaintiff. Under South African law, in contrast to the Canadian law, a 
fault ele~~~!_is required. __ . The defendant must hav~ acted inten!i~n_a!ly_ "1hich means 
!B_at _he must have been aware that it was the plaintiff who he referre~ _to with his 
defamatory statement and he must have the knowledge that he acted unlawfully in 
publishing the defamatory remark. 119 
5.1.6 Publication 
A further requirement in the Canadian law is that the defamatory remark complained 
of must be communicated to a third person, other than the defamed individual. 120 
There are no limitations on the way in which defamatory words are published. The 
words may be communicated directly by the defendant, either orally or in sot~f 
written form, by way of a symbolic act or by a poster, sign or cartoon. 121 Every 
participant in the publication is liable, regardless of the degree of his involvement. 
This includes not only those persons who participate in the composition of the 
defamation but also those who are responsible for its distribution and 
dissemination. 122 Furthermore, a person may be held liable for a defamatory 
116 Brown supra p.217 
117 Linden supra p. 683 
118 Ibid 
119 Burchell 'Defamation' supra p.143 
120 Linden supra p.691 
121 Brown supra p.250 
122 Linden supra p.693 
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publication of another person where he has some control over the machinery that 
produces it or over the location of the publication. 123 
Under the South African legal system t~e element of publication of_th~-?~fam~!ory (i; 
~!~tement _ ts also requ~!~d. This requirement distinguishes _the action __ for d_e(<!_Il_l_<!!_ion ff 
"!'rom Jhe ~ction f<?r a!_l_)mpairment of dignity because in the_ latt~r action the el~m~JJt 
of publication is not required. As in the Canadian law, publication of defamatory 
words take place when the statement is made known to a third person other than the 
person defamed. 124 Where there is a legal duty to act, publication can also take place 
by an omission. This is the case where there is a need for the public to be informed 
about a specific topic. 
Apart from the physical act of making the words known to a third person it is also 
required that there be a corresponding understanding of the meaning of the words by 
the recipient. 125 This criterion is quite flexible. In Vermaak v. Van der Merwe it was 
held that the immediate understanding of the meaning of the defamatory words is not 
necessary. It is sufficient if the reader or listener discovers the defamatory meaning 
or significance later, for example upon further reflection or by discussing the issue 
with other persons. 126 
As in the Canadian system, every person who is involved or participates m the 
publication of the defamatory statement such as the editor, proprietor or printer may 
be held liable for the defamatory words appearing in a newspaper or journal. 127 This 
is the case if the defendant knew or could have known that an outsider would have 
taken notice of the publication. However, the publication is presumed if the 
newspaper, book or other material containing the defamatory remarks has been sold 
or distributed to the public. 128 
Two further presumptions also arise from the publication of defamatory statements: 
the presumption of animus injuriandi and the presumption that the publication was 
123 Brown supra p.251 
124 Kinghorn supra p.235 
125 Burchell 'Defamation' supra p.69 
126 Vermaakv. Van der Merwe (1981) (3) SA p.78 at p.80 
127 Kinghorn supra p.235 
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unlawful. As it was stated in South Afi'ican Broadcasting Corporation v. 0 Malley 
.[ 
the "publication of defamatory words gives rise to a presumption that the words were 
<_ 
intentionally published and that the publication was unlawful". 129 The burden of 
- ----- ---------···-·---
proof then shifts to the defendant to establish either that there was some justification 
fo~ the defamatory statement or he must prove the absence of intention to defame. 130 
5.2 The content of the "general right of personality" under German law 
The general right of personality proteds an individual's inner personality, which 
alone serves as a basis for the free and responsible self-determination of a person. 131 
This right of personality as an "other right" according to par. 823 BGB is not defined 
in the provision itself It is an abstract term so its scope needs to be determined. 
Neither the BGB nor other statutes provide any guidelines or principles in order to 
determine the content of the right. Due to this statutory lacuna legal writers and 
German courts have developed requirements and guidelines to ascertain the ambit of 
the right. 
First, a violation of the right of personality is required. 132 In order to provide 
guidelines for such a violation, the German law distinguishes between three areas of 
protection which are in various ways strongly protected against external attacks. 
These personal spheres are the intimate or secret sphere ("Intimsphaere"), the private 
sphere ("Privatsphaere") and the individual sphere ("Individualshpaere"). 133 
The object of the intimate or secret sphere is the world of the inner thoughts and 
emotions of a person. These private thoughts and emotions can be written down in a 
diary or confidential letters, for instance. The intimate details about a human being's 
personality are not meant to be published unless the person agrees to their 
publication. 134 They are either completely secret or should be read only by a narrow 
circle of trusted friends. Thus, the intimate sphere enjoys absolute protection because 
128 Kinghorn supra p.235 
129 South African Broadcasting Corporation v. 0 Malley (1977) (3) SA (A.O.) p.606 at p.610 
130 Kinghorn supra p.226 
131 OLG NJW 1967, 2314, 2316 
132 Palandt supra par. 823 Rz.183 
133 Palandt supra par. 823 Rz 178 
134 BGH NJW 1988, 1984, 1985 
29 
it concerns the most intimate thoughts or feelings of a person. No person should be 
allowed to publish these confidential and personal details. Any unauthorised 
publication would amount to an infringement of a person's right of personality. 
The second sphere, or the private sphere, which is not as narrow as the first category, 
includes the family and other private life in the domestic circle135 Words which are 
communicated within the family circle are not supposed to leave the confidential 
domestic field. The difference between the secret and the private sphere is that the 
first sphere concerns thoughts, which should not even be communicated to other 
family members. If a person, for instance, writes confidential thoughts into a diary, 
usually no other person is entitled to read these statements. Thus, the protection of 
this sphere enjoys stronger protect1on under par. 823, subsection 1 of the BGB than 
infringements of the private sphere. 
The third category of possible violations of the personality is called the "individual 
sphere." This sphere preserves the personal individuality of man in his relationship 
with the environment around him. 136 The defamation occurs while the person is 
acting in his public, economical or professional life. Compared to the aforementioned 
spheres, words communicated within this sphere are not regarded as being as 
confidential or secret as in the secret or private sphere. The person acts in the public 
sphere and must therefore expect that his personality is more exposed to the public 
Therefore, the protection of his personality is not as absolute as it is in the intimate 
sphere. 
The classification of the three categories of personality under the German law is an 
attempt to provide guidelines in order to put the abstract right of one's own 
personality according to par. 823 of the BGB into a concret form. In some other 
cases, German courts have distinguished between the intimate sphere and injuries to 
honour. 137 However, this approach seems to be aimed in the same direction because 
violations in the individual sphere are injuries to one's honour and when a person is 
135 Schwerdtner supra par. 12 Rz. 231 
136 Palandt supra par. 823 Rz. 178 
137 BGHZ 36, 77; BGH NJW 1965, 1374 
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defamed in the general public it is his honour that is affected. 138 With either this latter 
classification or the first distinction between the three areas of protection the courts 
gain a first impression of which part of the personality is concerned and which 
"degree" of protection is required. 
After finding that the right of personality has been violated, the following task for the 
courts is to determine the limitations of the personality right 139 The general right of 
one's own personality is considered an "absolute" right under par. 823 BGB to the 
extent that it provides protection against everyone. However, that does not mean that 
a person who alleges a violation of his personality enjoys "absolute" protection. Not 
every violation amounts to a successful action for defamation. The right of 
personality is rather characterised as a general right and is classified under par. 823, 
subsection 1 BGB as a "general" or "open" clause ("Rahmenrecht"). 140 So, a 
violation of the personality right does not automatically constitute "unlawful" 
behaviour. The courts have rather to determine whether the defendant acted 
unlawfully. In order to ascertain whether or not an action amounts to unlawful 
behaviour the courts have to undertake a general balancing of the mutual rights and 
interests of the parties involved. The process of balancing rights requires the courts to 
take into consideration the rights and interests of the defendant as well as of the 
plaintiff. 141 One of the most important rights that can be asserted by the defendant is 
the right of freedom of expression or speech guaranteed by art. 5, subsection 1 of the 
German Constitution. 142 This right often conflicts with the right of personality. 
Which right will to be favoured depends on the particular circumstances of each case. 
The general principle is that the scope of art. 5 of the GG encompass opinions or 
value judgements ("Werturteile"). If a person alleges an incorrect fact about another 
person and knows that the fact is false, art. 5 GG is not applicable. 
138 Handford supra p.860 
139 Staudinger supra Vorbem zu par. 1 Rz. 27 
140 Staudinger supra Vorbem zu par. l Rz.27 
141 Gamm supra p.514 
142 Markesinis supra p.66 
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5.3 Comparative Conclusion 
The chapter about the criteria of defamation illustrates the difficulties that all three 
legal systems have defining defamatory words and conduct. Defamation, which 
includes various aspects such as dignity, reputation and privacy, is a non-legal 
concept and thus difficult to define. 
The Canadian and the South African legal systems provide some similar criteria in 
order to define defamatory words and conduct. Although the Canadian law does not 
define defamation as an "unlawful" publication like the South African law does the 
result is the same. Both legal systems understand defamation as a publication, which 
~ calculated to injure the reputation of another and tends to lower him in !~e 
estimation of right-thinking members of the society. The general test is therefore 
'Yhether a reasonable, objectively thinking person understood _ the words as 
1~fa~atory. Both legal systems acknowledge that the defamatory words may have an 
'"'ex~ei:i-~e_d meaning, which is known as innuendo. Another requirement that both legal 
systems have in common is that the defamatory statement must _:~f~~ to the plaintiff 
~nd moreover must be communicated to a third person. The major difference between 
the Canadian and the South African law is that the_ South African law requires an 
additional element of fault. Th~ defenda_nt __ must have intended . .to refer.to the plaintiff 
when __ Jnak@g_Jhe defamatory statement otherwise the pl~intiff ~ill_ n9t have a 
sµccessful action. Because the Canadian law is a strict liability tort, the defendant 
will be held liable even if he did not intend to refer his statement to the plaintiff. 
In contrast to the Canadian and the South African legal systems, the German law 
provides a completely different angle. [t does not try to give a definition of 
defamation but rather distinguishes between three different spheres of protection of 
the personality right. Because the right of personality according to par. 823 BGB is a 
general right, the courts have to undertake a general balancing of the rights and 
interests of both paiiies in order to determine whether the action of the defendant 
could be regarded as unlawful. Unlike the Canadian and the South African legal 
systems the German law does not require that the defamatory words be published to a 
third person, other than the defamed individual. The plaintiff can have a successful 
claim even if the words complained of are not communicated to a third person. 
., 
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Because the German law of defamation aims at the protection of the personality right, 
this right can be violated even if a third person does not hear or read the defamatory 
statement. The only problem that arises in this instance is that a violation of the 
personality right is difficult to prove for the plaintiff because there are no other people 
who can bear witness to the defamatory action. In sum, it can be concluded, that the 
criteria for defamatory words or conduct in the German law are not comparable to the 
Canadian nor the South African law. 
6.0 DEFENCES 
Once the plaintiff has proved the elements that are required for an action of 
defamation, the defendant has the possibility to raise various defences. 
In the Canadian law, several defences exist against an action of defamation. The most 
important defences are the defences of justification, absolute and qualified privileges, 
fair comment and consent. 
These defences are recognised under South African law also. The difference to the 
Canadian legal system is that the South African law distinguishes between defences 
by excluding the element of unlawfulness and those defences relating to the element 
of animus injuriandi. The main defences, which exclude the requirement of 
unlawfulness, are that of the trnth for the public benefit and the defences of absolute 
and qualified privilege, fair comment and consent all of which are recognised by the 
Canadian legal system. 
In order to rebut the inference of animus injuriandi, the defendant may prove that the 
statement was published in rixa or jest or that, by reason of special circumstances, the 
statement was published without animus injuriandi. 143 Due to the fact that the 
Canadian law of defamation does not require the element of fault, the defences 
excluding the element of animus injuriandi are not used in this legal system. 
143 Kinghorn supra p. 23 7 
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Some of the aforementioned defences are also recognised in the German legal system. 
Although the German law does not use the legal term "absolute" or "qualified" 
privilege, it acknowledges defences in a defamation action, which have similar legal 
requirements and effects. Other defences, such as the defence of justification, are not 
appropriate defences in the German legal system. Although the German law requires 
- as the South African system - an element of fault in an action for defamation, there 
do not exist special defences which exclude the element of fault. 
6.1 The defence of justification 
6.1.1 The legal situation in Canada and South Africa 
Justification or "truth" is a complete defence to a civil action for defamation in both 
the South African and the Canadian legal systems. 144 The reason for this defence is 
that the law does not allow a person to recover damages for injury to a character, 
-
which he either does not or should not possess. The burden of proving the truth of the -------- - ------- -• . -- - - - ---- --
remark rests on the defendant, as falsity is presumed in favour of the plaintiff. The 
defendant must substantiate all facts included in an allegation. 145 However, it is 
sufficient if the defendant proves that the substance of the defamatory statement is 
true. In other words, he must show that the "sting of the charge" of the libel or the 
"gist of the defamation" is true. 146 Where the defamatory statement is a general 
charge, for instance of dishonesty, the defendant must prove that the general charge is 
substantially true. He does not need to prove the truth of every detail he has 
alleged. 147 Where the plaintiff has established an innuendo, the defendant must plead 
and prove that the words are true in the meaning attributed to them. 148 
The difference between the Canadian and the South African systems is that the South 
African law additionally requires that the publication of the statement, which is 
allegedly true, is for the public benefit. "Public benefit" requires that some advantage 
144 Linden supra p.697; Kinghorn supra p.239 
145 Linden supra p.697; Kinghorn supra p.239 
146 Burchell 'Personality rights' supra p.272 
147 Hare v. Better Business Bureau of Vancouver (1948) 1 WW.R p.569 (B.C.S.C.) reprinted in 
Solomon/Feldthusen/Mills supra p.923; Amerasinghe supra p.86 
148 Feldt v. Bailey (1961) (4) SA p.545 at p.547 
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be conveyed to the public by the communication of the information. 149 The 
requirement of the public benefit depends on the subject matter of the statement and 
the time, manner and occasion of the publication. The general principle is that the 
truth about the character or conduct of individuals should be known. 150 · The 
publication of true statements about public officials and figures is in general regarded 
as being for the public benefit. 151 
In Zillie v. Johnson the court held that - under special circumstances - the public 
benefit can be considered grounds of justification on its own without proving the truth 
of the defamatory statement 152 However, this view was rejected by the Appellate 
Division in Neethling v. Du Preez; Neethling v. The Weekly Ma; l. In this case, the 
court decided that although the traditional defences did not constitute a closed list, 
that does not mean that a court is free to establish liability for the publication of a 
defamatory statement independently of the substantive requirements of the traditional 
defences. It pointed out that "our law does not recognise such a defence to an action 
of defamation." 153 The defence of "truth for the public benefit" is considered a 
complete defence containing both elements. Thus, a court is not competent to 
separate the element of truth from the element of public benefit and create a new 
defence by an abstract reference to a general principle of public policy. 
6.1.2 The legal situation in Germany 
A defence like justification or "truth" is not recognised in the German legal system. 
The reason for this lack is based on the fact that the law of defamation, unlike in the 
Canadian and the South African legal systems, not only encompasses the protection of 
the reputation but also provides a general protection of an individual's personality. 
The general right of personality protects a person's inner personality, which alone 
serves as a basis for his free and responsible self-determination. 154 This freedom to 
determine his own personality includes that the individual also has the right to 
determine which details of his personal life are exposed to the public. Even if these 
149 Burchell 'Defamation' supra p.213 
15° Kinghorn supra p.239; Burchell supra p.214 
151 De Beers v. De Villiers (1913) CPD p.543 (member of parliament) 
152 Zillie v. Johnson (1984-) (2) SA p.186 
153 Neethlingv. Du Preez; Neethlingv. The Weekly Mail (1994) (1) SA p.708 at p.777 
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details are based on true facts the individual is nevertheless free to decide whether 
information about his personal life should be exposed to the public. A good example 
is the Mephisto case in which the author Klaus Mann published details about the life 
and career of the director Gustav Gruendgens, which were basically based on true 
facts. However, the court did not consider the truth of the published information to be 
an appropriate defence. Even if the image of Gruendgens that was created in the 
novel was basically correct, the defamatory way the author presented Gruendgens' 
life affected the latter's reputation and dignity. Thus, justification or truth cannot be 
raised as a defence under the German legal system. 
6.2 The defence of absolute privilege 
6.2.1 The legal situation in Canada 
On the grounds of public policy, the Canadian law grants an absolute protection to 
high executive officials acting in the performance of their official duties. Like the 
defence of justification, absolute privilege is a complete defence and cannot be 
defeated on any grounds including malice. 155 The doctrine of absolute privilege is. 
based on the grounds that there are occasions in which society's interest is better 
served by the complete disclosure of information even though this may be at the 
expense of someone else's reputation. 156 Due to the risk of the abuse of this privilege, 
the Canadian law has interpreted the scope of this privilege narrowly. It is restricted 
to activities of governmental institutions such as the legislative, the executive and the 
. d. . 1157 JU 1c1a. 
With regard to the executive, the protection of the absolute privilege applies to high 
officials of the state, subordinate officials acting at request of high officials and 
military officials. All of these aforementioned persons must act within the scope of 
their official duties. 158 Furthermore, the Federal Court of Appeal for Canada pointed 
out in the case of Dowson v. The Queen that the protection extends only to statements 
154 Handford supra p.860 
155 Solomon/Feldthusen/Mills supra p. 945 
156 Linden supra p.698 
157 Brown supra p.401 
158 Brown supra p.402 
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made by one officer of state to another officer of state or to a subordinate authorised 
to carry out official duties. Moreover, the subject matter must relate to state 
matters. 159 
An absolute immunity is also recognised for any defamatory remarks made during 
parliamentary proceedings. In order to promote a frank and dynamic debate in the 
democratic institutions, the doctrine of absolute privilege applies to statements by 
members of the Parliament made in the House of Commons in the exercise of their 
duties. 160 Reports of the debates, however, enjoy only a qualified privilege. 161 The 
reason for this privilege rule is to be found in public policy in favour of democratic 
interest, which provides that legislators should not fear the liability of an action of 
defamation. They ought to speak freely without thinking about the possible 
consequences even though a third person's reputation might be injured. The 
protection of this absolute privilege only applies to parliament members during 
parliamentary proceedings. When a member speaks outside the Parliament m a 
defamatory sense, he does not enjoy immunity protection any longer. 162 
An absolute privilege to speak and write without fearing legal consequences also 
applies to judges, witnesses, advocates and other parties while participating in judicial 
proceedings. 163 The judicial privilege is based upon public policy considerations, 
which require that participants in a judicial proceeding should feel free to speak 
frankly and should not fear the disclosure of information, both of which are important 
for the judicial process. 164 The absolute privilege rule extends to three different 
categories of judicial proceedings, as it was stressed in the case of Lincoln v. Daniels 
The first category covers "all matters that are done coram Judice" extending to what is 
said "in the course of proceedings by judges, parties, counsel and witnesses" 
including "the contents of documents put in as evidence." 165 The second category 
contains pleadings and other documents initiating the judicial process. 166 In the third 
category fall matters done or said by counsel, parties and witnesses which are 
159 Dowson v. The Queen (1981), 124 D.L.R. (3d) p.260 (Fed.CA) reprinted in Brown supra p.403 
160 Ex parte Wason (1869), L.R. 4 O.B. p.576 
161 Linden supra p. 700 
162 Brown supra p.413 
163 Linden supra p.698-699 
164 Brown supra p.415 
165 Lincolnv. Daniels (1962) 1@ p.257-258 (C.A.) 
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preliminary but necessary to the institution of proceedings.
167 
Conversations between 
a solicitor and his client are also given absolute privilege, as long as they are 
reasonably related to the preparation of a trial. A statutory board or tribunal, which 
possess similar functions to a court, is also included in the absolute privilege 
doctrine. 168 
6.2.2 The legal situation in South Africa 
Under South African law the defence of absolute privilege is also recognised. 
However, compared to the Canadian legal system, the scope of this defence is limited 
10 statutory provisions which allow the defence o(_~~()lute pri~il~ge. 
According to the_ South African Constitution o_f 1996, s 58, _ subsection 1, cabinet 
~em~ers and members of the National Assembly enjoy the freedo~1 9f speech and 
d~bate in the Assembly and in its committees, subject to its rules and orders. They are 
not liable to civil or criminal proceedings, arrest, imprisonment or damages for 
"anything they have said in, produced before or submitted to the Assembly or any of 
its committees." Furthermore, they are not liable for "anything revealed as a result of 
anything that they have said in, produced before or submitted to the Assembly or any 
of its committees."169 Thus, the statements of any member in or before the 
parliament, any committee or the Assembly are considered matters of absolute 
privilege. 
Apart from this absolute immunity defence_for member-s-ef-P-aFliament-;--the-South 
L.. - ~ • . - ' 
Africa1:1: law does not recognise further absolute privileges. 
.. -
6.2.3 The legal situation in Germany 
The German law also recognises a defence of absolute privilege. Compared to the 
Canadian system, the ambit of this defence is restricted to an absolute immunity 
166 Lincoln v. Daniels supra p.257-258 
167 Brown supra p.448 
168 Linden supra p.699 
169 s 58 (1) Constitution of South Africa 1996 
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granted to parliamentarians under special circumstances. In this way, the German law 
is closer to the South African system. 
Art. 46, subsection 1 of the German Constitution provides that "a member may at no 
time be subjected to court proceedings or disciplinary action or otherwise called to 
account outside the Bundestag for a statement made in the Bundestag or any of its 
committees." However, the article continues to make clear that the immunity "shall 
not apply to defamatory insults." 170 
This shows that the German law - in contrast to both the Canadian and the South 
African legal systems - draws a distinction between ordinary statements and 
defamatory insults. Statements made during a political debate are covered by the 
protection of the immunity principle as long as the member of the parliament does not 
insult others in a defamatory sense. However, in a heated political discussion it is 
sometimes difficult to separate "ordinary" statements from defamatory insults. The 
practice in the German parliament shows that the line between ordinary political 
statements and insulting statements of a defamatory nature is difficult to draw. The 
Canadian and the South African systems do not make this distinction so these 
difficulties would not arise. Nevertheless, the German Constitution presents a basic 
guideline for immunity protection for parliamentarians. They should enjoy the 
political debate without fearing legal consequences as long as they do not insult other 
parliamentarians in a defamatory sense. 
6.3 The defence of qualified pt'ivilege 
6.3.1 The legal situation in Canada 
In contrast to absolute privileges, qualified privileges are of a conditional nature. The 
privilege rule applies to certain occasions which are regarded as of lesser importance 
than those absolutely privileged. In this situation certain communications for 
specified purposes are exempt from liability for defamation, unless it is shown that the 
defendant made the statement with actual or express malice. 171 This privileged 
170 art. 46 of the German Basic Law 
171 Linden supra p. 702; Williams in Klar supra p.280 
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occasion occurs if a person makes a statement either in the discharge of either a public 
or private duty, whether legal or moral. It also applies for the purpose of pursuing or 
protecting some private interest, provided that it is published to a person who has 
some corresponding interest in receiving it. 172 The test is whether the "common 
convenience and welfare of society" demands such a statement. 173 As the notion 
"qualified" indicates, the extent of the qualified privilege is limited. There exist four 
major categories where qualified privileges apply. 
The first category is the right of an individual to defend and protect his own personal 
and private interests. It has been recognised in the context involving the protection or 
recovery of personal or real property, the defence of an individual's business interests 
or reputation, and the protection of personal interests or reputation. 174 The privilege is 
similar to self-defence. Thus, the response is limited to those utterances that are 
reasonably necessary to meet the original attack. 175 
The privilege will also apply to communications between parties on a subject in 
which both the speaker and the recipient have a common legitimate interest. 176 The 
privilege is based on public policy and is considered necessary for the general 
convenience, benefit and welfare or society. 177 The privilege has been granted to two 
different situations. The first group of cases applies to internal communications that 
take place within a family unit, a business, governmental or religious organisations or 
other social institutions such as schools, hospitals or trade unions. The second applies 
to external communications between individuals or organisations who promote or 
secure common interest, particularly of a pecuniary nature. 178 In such situations, 
people may discuss matters of mutual economic interest in a privileged setting 
Shareholders and directors, for instance, are allowed to exchange information about 
customers without fearing liability. 
172 Brown supra p.465 
173 Halls v. Mitchell (1928) 2 D.L.R. p.97 (S.C.C.) 
174 Brown supra p.509 
175 Linden supra p. 704 
176 Brown supra p.537 
177 Jones v. Bennett (1969) ~C.R. p.277 
178 Brown supra p.538 
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The third category protects a person who makes a remark in the discharge of a public 
or private duty, whether legal, moral or social. The recipient of this statement must 
have a reciprocal interest in receiving it. 179 An example is when someone is acting on 
behalf of a family member to protect the interest of the family. The privilege applies 
also to an employer who releases information about the conduct or character of a 
former employee to a new employer. Information given to persons who are involved 
in business transactions with the plaintiff about the latter's character, credit or 
integrity is also protected. The trader has a legitimate interest to gather important 
information about the financial situation and credit of his business partner. 18° Finally, 
qualified privilege is also recognised where a person makes a statement in order to 
protect the well being of another. 
The fourth category relates to communications by, to or between public officials, who 
may be expected to act officially. 181 The problem that arises in this context is whether 
the communication is protected by an absolute immunity or whether it enjoys 
qualified privilege. The general rule in this regard is that absolute privilege applies to 
utterances made by a public official acting within the scope of his official duties 
involving a high officer of the state. Public officials with a less powerful position 
such as a mayor or a town councillor are protected by the qualified privilege rule. 182 
Similarly, the person who claims the protection of qualified privilege, must act in 
accordance with his official duties and the published matter must be of public interest. 
6.3.2 The legal situation in South Africa 
The South African law_yJ~o r_egog~i~es_ qualified privil~g~ as a_defence. Like in the 
Canadian law, qualified privilege or provisional immunity will be accorded to 
---• •••---~ • <• ••••- -L• •---- •----•-
statements_ published by a perso~ ~n ~ertain ~ccasions. "!:he publication will be 
W!_~ngful __ if th~.e_1._1_blj_sher a_cted with_an improper motive or maliciously, 183 The onus 
179 Williams supra p. 78 
180 Brov.n supra p.534 
181 Brown supra p.571 
182 Brown supra p.572-573 
183 Burchell 'Personality rights' supra p.286 
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rests on the defendant to prove the elements of the defence of privileged occasion on a 
-•-•- 0 •- -•OR - - ~ •••• - - "'"'• - - ----•--- • • 
p__repe>_nderc!_n_c~ Qf_prob_<!bilities: 184 
Under South African law, three maJor categories of qualified privileges are 
recognised: 
The first category can be compared to the_ ca__!~gcny of "common interest or mutual 
concer~~~~ !he "duty to _p_rote5t anC>ther'_s. intere~t''. in __ the Canadian law 
Under this category it is lawful to publish a defamatory statement in the discharge of a 
duty or in the exercise of a right recognised by law to a person who has a 
corresponding interest or a duty to receive the statement. 185 This reciprocity of duty 
or rights need not arise from any confidential relationship between the person making 
the statement and the person receiving it It is sufficient if there is a legitimate mutual 
interest, for the publisher in publishing the defamatory statement and for the recipient 
in receiving the statement. 186 The duty or right may be legal, moral or social. The 
classic example of a statement made on a privileged occasion is where an employer 
writes a reference on behalf of an employee. The employer has a right to comment on 
the integrity and ability of his former employee provided that spite or other improper 
motive do not prompt him. The prospective employer of that person has a 
corresponding right to receive these remarks. 
The second major category concerns statements made in the course of judicial or 
quasi-judicial proceedings. Quasi-judicial tribunals include rent boards, judicial 
commissions and other forms of investigating bodies. 187 The difference from the 
Canadian law is that this category is granted only on privileged occasions whereas the 
Canadian law recognises it as an absolute privilege. 
It is generally accepted that the publication of defamatory statements, in the course of 
proceedings before a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, is lawful. 188 In May v. [!cf.win, 
the Appellate Division laid down the principles of judicial privilege It held that 
184 Burchell 'Personality rights' supra p.298 
185 Kinghorn supra p.242 
186 Burchell 'Personality rights' supra p.287 
187 Kinghorn supra p.245 
188 Kinghorn supra p.244-245 
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judges, magistrates, witnesses, litigants, advocates and attorneys enjoy the protection 
of a qualified, not absolute, privilege concerning statements made in the course of 
judicial proceedings. 189 As far as judges and magistrates are concerned, there is a 
presumption that they have acted lawfully and within the scope of their authorities. 
The plaintiff can rebut this presumption if he proves that the judge or the magistrate 
~s actuated -by malice or improper _motief Witnesses, litigants: advocate-s and 
attorn~ys only enjoy the privilege if the defamatory words were relevant to the case 
and founded on some reasonable cause. 190 
As in the Canadian legal system, reports of the proceedings of the courts, the 
parliament or other public bodies are protected by the qualified privilege. The reason 
for this immunity is that persons who are unable to participate in court proceedings 
should be able to learn from the reports the manner in which justice is administered. 
The defence does not apply if the defendant fails to prove that the report is fair and 
accurate. 191 The immunity is not granted if the publisher acted with an improper 
motive. Similar considerations apply to the publication of reports of the proceedings 
of the parliament or of an authority or body entrusted with a public duty in relation to 
a matter of public interest. 192 
6.3.3 Exercising a legitimate interest under German law 
The German law also accepts a defence, which is similar to that of qualified 
privilege. 193 This applies to cases where the defendant, in defaming another person, 
exercises a legitimate interest. This defence is based on par. 193 of the German 
Criminal Code, which states that the assertion and distribution of untrue facts can be 
justified if the defendant exercises a legitimate interest. The defence does not apply if 
the publisher knows that the facts are untrue. In other words, the defendant must 
believe that the statement complained of is based on true facts. Par. 193 of the 
German Criminal Code concerns those cases where the public has an interest in the 
disclosure of information and this public interest is a justification for the defendant. 
189 May v. Udwin (1981) (1) SA p.1 at p.19 
190 Mayv. Udwin suprap.19 
191 Kinghorn supra p.246 
192 Kinghorn supra p.246 
193 Schwerdtner supra par. 12 Rz. 259 
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The typical case is one in which a journalist publishes details about a public figure 
about whom the public has an interest. The journalist must believe that the 
information, which he publishes, is true and he must also believe that the public has a 
legitimate interest in the revelation this information. This defence is similar to the 
"duty to protect another's interest" defence in the Canadian law or the defence of 
"exercising of a right or the furtherance of a legitimate interest" under South African 
law. What these three defences all have in common is the idea that the public has an 
interest in gathering important information and that this interest is the basis for the 
defendant's justification. 
6.4 Fair comment 
A fair comment also functions as a defence to a civil action for defamation under the 
Canadian law. The subject of the statement must be of genuine public interest and 
should not be based on scandalous or unworthy grounds. 194 There are two categories 
where this defence applies. The first category includes those things in which the 
public has a legitimate interest, such as governmental activities, political debate, and 
proposals by public figures. Second, works of art such as theatrical performances, 
music and literature fall within the scope of this defence. 195 In order to mount the 
defence of fair comment, it must be based on true facts. 196 The onus is on the 
defendant to prove that all of the facts published are true. Furthermore, in order for 
the comment to be privileged, it must be fair. This is the case if the comment is 
conceived in the "spirit ~fa fair discussion." 197 The view expressed must be honest 
and must be such that it can fairly be called criticism. Although the comment must be 
fair, it does not required to be reasonable. Individuals are entitled to express their 
unreasonable views as long as they are based on true facts. The defence of fair 
comment can be destroyed if it can be proved that the defendant acted with malice. 198 
The South African law also rec_Qgnis~ _ _1he defence_ofJair commen.t _and applies the 
same requirements to it as the Canadian law does. ~i!st, the ~-~~eg_a!~?_n in question has 
194 Williams supra p.113 
195 Linden supra p.711 
196 Linden supra p. 711 
197 Brown supra p.686 
198 Williams supra p.114 
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to be characteris_~ as a comment. !n other words, the ordinary reasonable man must~-
b~ ~~l~ tg r~cQgl!ise the statement as an expression of an opinion and_ not as a 
statement_ of fact. 199 _ Furthermore, the factual allegation upon which the comment is 
made must be true. It is sufficient for the defendant to show that the facts upon which 
th~_comment was based are substantially true, he does not need to prove the ~ruth of 
every detail. 200 As in the Canadian law, the comment must be fair. A comment is fair 
if it is an honest or genuine expression of the defendant's opinion, and it is relevant to 
and warranted by the facts commented upon even if it is exaggerated or prejudiced. 201 
In order to establish the defence of fair comment, the defendant also has to prove that 
the comment is of public interest. Such matters not only apply to the conduct of 
public officials but also include matters submitted for public criticism, for example 
speeches made in public, public performances, works of art and literary works. 202 
The defendant bears the onus of proof of the requirements that constitute the defence 
of the fair comment. Jhe plaintiff may defeat the defence by sho~ing that the 
s_tatement wa~l)~bli_sl_!_e~ :ith an i~pr~per malice. 203 ~- --
The German law also recognises a defence similar to the defence of fair comment in 
the Canadian and the South African legal systems. Under German law, the defendant 
can assert his rights of freedom of expression and speech guaranteed under art. 5 of 
the German Constitution. Art. 5 of the GG covers the expression of opinions 
("Werturteile") as opposed to false allegations of facts ("Tatsachenbehauptung") that 
are uttered in the consciousness of being wrong.204 Opinions are expressions of 
subjective judgements about an issue or a person. A comment is also an expression of 
a subjective opinion. However, the right of freedom of expression under art. 5 GG is 
not considered a "defence" under German law. As it was described above, German 
courts have to undertake a general balancing of the different rights and interest of both 
the plaintiff and the defendant. This is the place in which the defendant can assert his 
right of freedom of expression and the courts have to judge which right, the right of 
personality or the right of freedom of expression, has to be favoured. On the basis of 
199 Kinghorn supra p.247 
200 Burchell 'Personality rights' supra p.278 
201 Burchell 'Personality rights' supra p.278 
202 Kinghorn supra p.24 7 
203 Kinghorn supra p.247 
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art. 5 GG the defendant can then assert that his opinion on an issue was fair and of 
public interest.205 However, art. 5 GG mandates that such a defence is not applicable 
if the privilege has been exceeded. In the Mephisto case, for instance, the court 
reasoned that art. 5 GG did not apply because the personal revenge of the author 
towards the protagonist came through in the novel and had resulted in serious 
distortions. 206 Thus, the description of the director Gustav Gruendgens by Klaus 
Mann could not be considered a "fair" opinion or comment. 
6.5 Consent 
In the Canadian, the South African and also the German law, consent is also a defence 
to a defamation action.207 The defence applies cases where the plaintiff instigated, 
procured or invited the publication of the defamatory statement. The defence is only 
applicable to the words which the plaintiff expressly or impliedly agrees to. 208 The 
privilege is based on the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria. 209 In other words, a 
plaintiff who has consented to the defamatory remark cannot complain about the 
violation of his reputation caused by the publication. The consent has to be given 
either prior to or simultaneously with the publication. Due to the fact that this defence 
has a narrow scope of application the consent must be given for each publication 
separately. Therefore, if a person, for instance, consents to discuss on a radio 
programme certain information that might be defamatory of him, he does not thereby 
agree to defamatory comment on the programme afterwards. 210 
6.6 Defences excluding the fault element under South African law 
Apart from the defences excluding the element of unlawfulness, the South African 
law also recognises defences that exclude the element of animus injuriandi, namely 
rixa and jest and certain kinds of mistakes. 
204 Schwerdtner supra par.12 Rz.252,253 
205 Handford supra p.867 
206 BGH NJW 1968, 1773, 1777 
207 Amerasinghe supra p.161; Brown supra p.389; Palandt supra par. 823 Rz. 184 
208 Brown supra p.389 
209 Williams supra p.106; Williams in Klar supra p.280; Amerasinghe supra p.161-162 
210 Linden supra p.716 
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6.6.1 Rixa or jest 
The presumption of animus injuriandi can be rebutted by proof of the fact that the 
statement was published in rixa, which means in great and sudden anger provoked by 
the person defamed. 211 The immunity afforded can be said to be similar to that 
provided in cases of self-defence. However, the basis of this defence is not yet 
clarified. The Supreme Court of Appeal has not yet decided whether provocation is 
definitely a defence to exclude the presumption of animus injuriandi or the 
presumption of unlawfulness. 
Statements which are understood as good-natured fun or which simply cause 
amusement are not necessarily deemed defamatory. 212 The test for ascertaining the 
meaning of the words and whether the meaning can be regarded as defamatory is an 
objective one. In other words, the reasonable reader or bystander must have 
understood the words as a joke. In both situations - provocation and jest - the burden 
of proof rests on the defendant. 
6.6.2 Mistake 
Since consciousness is a substantial element of animus injuriandi" a mistaken belief in 
the lawfulness of a publication may enable the defendant to avoid liability. The kinds 
of mistakes that exclude the element of fault, however,; are not cle1J.rly_d_efined_in_ 
South African law. ~on1~tim_e_s _ it js_ §t~t~cJthat the mistake .should_he_an.honest-oneE-3 
The dominant view is, however, that the defendant may rely on a negligent_mistake 214 
6.7 Summary 
It can be said that there are some defences in an action for defamation that are 
recognised in all three legal systems. These are the defences of fair comment, consent 
and absolute privilege. With regard to the latter defence both the South African as 
well as the German law only acknowledge absolute immunity for statements made by 
211 Kinghorn supra p. 250 
212 Burchell 'Defamation' supra p.285 
013 - Hassen v. Post Newspapers Ltd. (1965) (3) SA p.562 
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members of the Parliament during parliamentary proceedings. The Canadian law 
provides a broad~r application of the absolute immunity defence. It applies the 
absolute privilege also to activities of high state officials and to statements made by 
judges, witnesses and advocates while attending judicial proceedings. In contrast, the 
South African law considers defamatory remarks made in the course of judicial 
proceedings to be a qualified privilege. The German law does not recognise 
statements published during judicial proceedings as a defence in an action for 
defamation either as an absolute or as a qualified privilege. It acknowledges the 
principle of independence for judges which grants that judges can act independently 
in court proceedings as long as they are neutral and do not have prejudices against the 
parties. 215 However, this principle of the independence of judges is not regarded as a 
defence in an action of defamation. 
Another defence that all three legal systems have in common is the qualified privilege 
of exercising a legitimate interest. This defence is based on the grounds that the 
publication of a defamatory statement should be privileged if the disclosure of 
information is exercised in the discharge of a duty or right, and the recipient has a 
corresponding interest or duty to receive the information. 
The defence of justification or truth is only known in the Canadian and the South 
African legal systems. The latter legal system requires furthermore that the facts must 
be true and for the public benefit. The German law of defamation provides a broad 
protection of a person's personality. This allows a person the freedom to determine 
which aspects of his personality should be exposed to the public. Therefore, the 
German law considers the assertion of true facts irrelevant as a defence in a 
defamation action. 
7.0 COMPENSATION IN AN ACTION FOR DEFAMATION 
Once the plaintiff has proved that the defendant has defamed his reputation or his 
personality the question that arises is what kind of compensation he can expect. 
214 Kinghorn supra p.250 
215 see art. 97 of the Gennan Basic Law 
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Apparently, there are major differences between the three legal systems in dealing 
with the problem of granting damages in defamation actions. 
7.1 Libel and Slander in the Canadian legal system 
The Canadian law provides two basic remedies for an action of defamation. The first 
allows the plaintiff to claim for an injunction in order to restrain the defamatory 
publication in advance. The court will grant an injunction only under special 
circumstances, namely where the words are clearly defamatory and the defendant 
either does not deny their falsity or, if the defendant does deny the falsity, it would be 
impossible for the defendant to succeed on a plea of justification 216 In addition, an 
injunction will only be granted where there is a reasonable apprehension of a 
repetition of the tort.217 Canadian courts are usually quite reluctant to grant such an 
injunction because, as it was stated in Can. Metal Co. v. C.B.C., the restriction of a 
publication in advance may undermine the freedom of speech and expression. 218 
Therefore, the second basic remedy provided by the Canadian law, namely the claim 
for damages, is more successful. 
The damages which can be claimed by the plaintiff depend upon whether he brings an 
action for libel or and an action for slander. The Canadian law draws a distinction in 
the common law between libel and slander. The former concerns defamatory material 
contained in written publications and extends to material embodied in some 
permanent form which is visible to the human eye. 219 It is actionable without proof of 
special damages, the damages are rather presumed. In other words, libel is treated as 
actionable per se. 220 Slander, on the other hand, consists of defamatory statements in 
oral publications. In order to recover for slander, the plaintiff must prove special 
damages.221 
216 Brown vol.2 supra p.1085 
217 Williams supra p.146 
218 Can. Metal Co. v. CBC. (1975) 7 O.R. (2d) p.261 
219 Linden supra p.687 
220 Brown supra p.289 
221 Waddams 'The Law of Defamation' Chapter 4: Loss of Reputation (1983) p.293; Linden supra 
p.691 
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However, there are four types of slander which are actionable per se so that special 
damages do not need to be specifically pleaded or proved. The first exception 
concerns defamatory remarks that impute the commission of a criminal offence. Guilt 
must be alleged and the crime must be of a serious nature. It is not necessary to 
specify a particular crime, a general accusation of having committed a serious crime is 
sufficient.222 The reason for this exception is that the plaintiff might be placed in a 
position where another person initiates criminal proceedings against him. 
Another exception where libel is actionable per se is the imputation of a loathsome or 
contagious disease. 223 The scope of this exception has been limited to venereal 
diseases and leprosy. The reason for this rule is that knowledge of society suggests 
that all prudent persons will avoid contact with a person suffering from such serious 
diseases. 224 
To accuse a woman of promiscuity is actionable per se as well. An accusation of 
lesbianism has been held to be actionable per se and the same view has been taken of 
an allegation that a man is homosexual. 225 
Defaming a person in relation to his business, trade, profession, office or other 
employment activities is also actionable per se. The reason for this exception is that 
the law presumes the possibility of pecuniary loss from such imputation. 226 This rule 
protects a person from defamatory statements no matter how lowly or base their 
occupation may be. 
In an action for libel or for slander per se, damage to the reputation is presumed. This 
presumption may either flow from common law principles or may be the result of 
statutory provisions.227 Where damages are presumed, general damages are 
consequently awarded. General damages include injury to reputation, mental 
suffering, distress and any actual or anticipated pecuniary loss or social disadvantage. 
In order to estimate the award of the damages the court may take into account a 
222 Linden supra p.689 
223 Brown supra p.320 
224 Brown supra p.320 
225 Linden supra p.690 
226 Brown supra p.323 
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number of factors. These circumstances are basically the conduct and character of the 
person responsible for the publication of the defamatory matter, the conduct and 
character of the plaintiff and the nature, mode, scope and character of the defamatory 
publication. 228 
In an action for slander, the plaintiff has to prove the existence of special damages to 
his reputation. Special damages mean actual financial or material loss. It is not 
sufficient for the plaintiff to establish that his reputation has been damaged for that 
would open the door for general damages. Rather, he has to demonstrate further 
damages, for instance, loss of business profits. 229 
Apart from general or special damages, the court is free to award punitive damages. 
The purpose of a punitive damages award is to punish or deter and it may be granted 
in addition to compensatory damages.230 These damages are limited to exceptional 
cases, namely to serious violations of the plaintiffs personality. The plaintiff has to 
show "malicious conduct" on the part of the defendant, "conscious, contumelious and 
calculated wrongdoing" or behaviour which can be described as "gross", "reckless" or 
"outrageous. "231 
7 .2 Computation of damages under South African law 
Unlike the Canadian legal system, the~th_A(rican l~g_a_l _sy~s_t_em~d_o_e_s_n_o_t_d_ra_w_a 
distinction between libel and slander. This was clearly stated in an early case in 1904 
by the Natal Supreme Court in Nicolson v. A Roberts. In this case the court pointed 
out that unlike the E~gl~h_ law which draws a distinction between written and oral 
de(amation the South African_ law does not recognise this distinction. 232 
Consequently, under S
0
outh African law it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove 
se,ecial damages in orqer to claim damagesjn an.action.for_slander, 
227 see examples in Williams supra p.144 fn.48 
228 Brown vol.2 supra p.1008-1009 
229 Waddams supra p.293 
230 Williams supra p.142 
231 Brown vol.2 supra p.1065 
232 Nicolson v. A Roberts (1904) 25 NLR 278 at p.282 
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The South African legal system recognises two basic civil remedies in defamatioiil 
cases in order to compensate the plaintiff for his injured reputation: He can apply for 
an interdict restraining the violation of his personality right, or he can bring an action 
to recover damages for the impairment of his reputation. 233 With regard to the latter 
claim, the plaintiff is entitled to an award of general damages to compensate him for 
his injured reputationJ The principles to be applied for the granting of general 
damages are the same as in the Canadian law. The court has a broad discretion in 
determining the award ex aequo et bono and may take into account the following 
circumstances: 
First, the court may take into consideration the nature of the defamatory statement and7 
the probable consequences of the defamation. Imputations of serious crimes may 
cause greater harm to an individual's reputation than imputations of private 
immorality and will therefore result in higher awards of damages.234 The nature and 
extent of the publication also affects the award of damages. A defamatory remark in a 
serious ne\YSP~~r with a broad circulation may harm a person's reputation more than 
a publication of a defamato1y statement in a newspaper subscribed to only by a few 
people. The court may also take into account the character and the conduct of the 
plaintiff. 235 The conduct of the plaintiff, for instance, may have provoked the 
C • 
defamatory statement, which would reduce the award of damages. The motives and 
the conduct of the defendant also play a role in estimating the _ amount _ of t~e 
cq_mpensation. F~r example, expressio~s of regret or ~pology 1~ght be a mitigati_ng 
fa~tor236 In sum it can b~ said that all _of these mention~--~ircumstances are b~ no 
means exhaustive. The court is entitled to take into account any factor that i~ 
relevant in assessment of damages. 
--- - - ~.-..:..- --··-- -- --
Like the Canadian legal system the /South African courts can also give effect to 
punitive damages if the plaintiff has suffered a serious infringement of his 
constitutionally protected righ~ The Appellate Division in the leading case 
Salzmann v. Holmes recognised that in a defamation case punitive damages may be 
awarded if serious damages can be proved. [The court based its decision on the fact 
233 Burchell 'Personality rights' supra p.435 
234 Kinghorn supra p.252 
235 Muller v. SA Associated Newspapers Ltd and Others (1972) (2) SA p.589 at p.595 
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that in Roman-Dutch law the actio injuriarum had a penal origin and therefore the ( 
sum awarded was originally in the nature of a penalty. 237 0 
7 .3 Computation of damages under German law 
As opposed to the Canadian legal system, the German legal system does not 
distinguish between damages awarded for the spoken word and those granted for the 
written word. Because the German law of defamation aims at the protection of an 
individual's personality, every aspect of this personality is protected. A person's 
picture is protected the same way as his spoken word. Thus, the recording of a 
person's spoken word by tape recorder without permission is actionable in the same 
way that the publication of a picture of a person without his consent is. 238 Therefore, 
the German law does not draw a distinction between libel and slander and is in so far 
comparable to the South African system. 
With regard to compensation in money the German system is different from the 
Canadian and the South African legal systems. Monetary compensation is not 
regarded as the primary remedy for delict under the German law. The basic principle 
of compensation is laid down in par. 249 of the BGB. According to this provision 
restitution in kind is the primary remedy in a delict case. It states that "a person who 
is bound to make compensation shall bring about the condition which would exist if 
the circumstance making him liable to compensate had not occurred". Par. 249 BGB 
covers various orders of an injunctive nature, as also provided in the South African 
and Canadian legal systems as a possible remedy in a defamation action. Under par. 
249 BGB the plaintiff also has the possibility to claim compensation in a so-called 
"Unterlassungsklage" restraining further harm if such harm is imminent.239 
In cases where the aforementioned remedies are not sufficient, par. 251 BGB applies. 
This provision provides that in so far as restitution in kind is not possible or 
insufficient to compensate the injured person, the person who is liable shall 
236 Kinghorn supra p.252 
237 Salzmann v. Holmes (1914) AD p.471 atp.480 
238 Handford supra p.862 
239 Gamm supra p.517; Ennan "Handkommentar zum BGB' 7th edition Band 1 (1981) Vor par.823 
Rz.89 ff 
53 
compensate him in money. However, par. 253 BGB restricts the cases where 
monetary compensation may be obtained. For violations which are not those of 
property, compensation in money may be awarded only in the cases expressly 
mentioned by law. In a defamation action the most important provision which allows 
monetary compensation is par. 847 BGB. This provision states as follows: 
"In the case of injury to body or health, or in the case of deprivation of liberty, 
the injured party may also demand an equitable compensation in money for 
the damage which is not a pecuniary loss ... " 
The leading case in which the Bundesgerichtshof awarded damages for violations of 
the personality right was the Herrenreiter case. This case concerned the owner of a 
brewery who was famous as an amateur rider at horse shows. The defendant was a 
manufacturer of special pharmaceutical products for the increase of sexual potency. 
In order to advertise this product in Germany, the defendant dispersed a poster with 
the picture of the plaintiff without his permission. The plaintiff objected to this 
picture as being used for an advertisement for virility pills and claimed damages.240 
The court reasoned that the plaintiff had suffered an injury to his personality right 
guaranteed under par. 823, subsection 1 of the BGB because he had been completely 
exposed in a picture appearing in connection with virility pills and this widely 
disseminated picture thus humiliated him in his personality. Damages of this 
personality right are to be compensated in money. The comt based this monetary 
compensation on an analogy of par. 847 BGB by referring to the term "deprivation of 
liberty" in this provision. According to the court the term "liberty" in par. 847 BGB 
referred not only to physical liberty but also to freedom of the will, especially the 
freedom to exercise his own determination over his own personality. 241 If such 
blameworthy depreciation of the personality right is in question, the legal protection 
can only be obtained by an inclusion in the violation mentioned in par. 847 BGB. 
However, in another important case, the Ginseng root case, the Bundesgerichtshof 
based the award of monetary compensation on par. 253 BGB in conjunction with art. 
240 BGHZ 26,349,350 ff 
241 BGHZ 26, 349, 362 ff 
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1 and 2 of the German Constitution. 242 In this case the plaintiff, a law professor, had 
given a ginseng root that he had brought from a stay in Korea to a friend, a professor 
for science for research. The latter mentioned in an article that he had obtained the 
ginseng root with the "kind assistance" of the plaintiff. This statement led to the 
plaintiff being described in a widely spread scientific journal as one of the best-known 
ginseng researchers of Europe. The defendant company, one that dealt in a tonic 
which contained ginseng, placed an advertisement for this tonic which represented the 
plaintiff as advocating the properties of ginseng as an aphrodisiac. The plaintiff 
claimed that this advertisement gave rise to the impression that he lent his name to 
advertise a doubtful product and thus had been the target of ridicule from the public 
and from his students. 243 The Court confirmed the decision of the Herrenreiter case 
in that according to par. 253 BGB monetary compensation can be claimed for non-
pecuniary damage only in cases expressly mentioned by the law. However, it did not 
base its decision on par. 847 BGB as in the Herrenreiter case but rather referred to a 
direct application of art. 1 and 2 of the German Basic law as means of granting 
damages. The basis of this approach is that the legislators of the BGB did not foresee 
in 1900 that the personality would be a protected right and that the provisions of the 
BGB, in particular par. 847 BGB, would be limited accordingly. Due to the fact that 
the provisions of the BGB do not provide sufficient remedies in a defamation action, 
art. 1 and 2 of the German Basic Law themselves compelled the recognition of a right 
to damages without any reference to par. 84 7 BGB. 244 
In sum, these two important cases show that monetary compensation is awarded in an 
action of defamation even if the legal basis varies. Since the Ginseng case German 
courts have adhered to a settled practice in granting damages for invasions of the 
personality. However, the courts make clear that the granting of monetary 
compensation is limited to cases where the violation is serious and there is no other 
sufficient remedy. 245 This attitude shows that compensation in money is still regarded 
as a secondary remedy in a delict case and particularly in an action for defamation. 
242 BGHZ 35 363 
243 BGHZ 35: 363, 365 ff 
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245 Handford,supr~ p.871 
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Punitive damages which are granted under the Canadian and the South African system 
are not acknowledged by the German law. The German law draws a clear distinction 
between the civil and the criminal law. In an action for defamation the plaintiff has 
the opportunity to claim damages before a civil court and simultaneously file a 
lawsuit before a criminal court because of defamatory insult according to par. 185 of 
the German Criminal Code. The monetary compensation awarded under par. 823 
BGB in conjunction with 253, 847 BGB is of a purely civil nature and does not have-
unlike the Canadian and the South African legal systems - a penal origin. The fact 
that is striking is that the requirement for granting punitive damages under both the 
Canadian and the South African legal systems, namely that the violation has to be of a 
serious nature, is the same as that for monetary compensation granted by the German 
law. Monetary compensation under the German law is only awarded if the violation 
of a personality right is serious and no other remedy is sufficient. 
7.4 Comparative Conclusion 
The companson makes clear that the three legal systems provide different 
requirements and principles for compensation granted in an action for defamation. 
The first major difference between the legal systems is that in the Canadian law the 
compensation depends upon the question of whether the plaintiff sues in an action for 
libel or in an action for slander. Both the South African and the German legal 
systems do not follow this approach which seems to be the preferable way. Apart 
from historical reasons there is no obvious reason why the award of damages in a 
defamation action must depend on the question of whether it is a spoken or a written 
word that defames the plaintiff in his personality. Apparently, it makes no difference 
for the plaintiff in which form the defamatory statement is published. The result, 
namely a violation of this reputation or his personality, is the same. 
Another difference between the legal systems is structural. The German law grants 
compensation in money only as a secondary remedy. Unlike the Canadian and the 
South African legal systems, damages for non-pecuniary violations are the exception 
and are only awarded where the law itself expressly allows monetary compensation 
for infringements that are not of a pecuniary nature. Due to the fact that provisions of 
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the BGB such as par. 253 or 847 BGB do not expressly grant damages for non-
pecuniary violations, German courts have obvious difficulties in interpreting the 
statutes in order to grant damages in a defamation action. The reason for these 
difficulties is that the legislator of the BGB did not foresee in 1900 that the 
personality would be a protected right and the provisions of the BGB, in particular 
par. 847 BGB, were limited accordingly. Both the Canadian and the South African 
legal systems do not confront these difficulties. Canadian and South African courts 
have wide discretion in granting monetaiy compensation in a defamation action 
without the need to interpret statutes. 
Apart from these differences the chapter about compensation in the three different 
legal systems showed that the Canadian, the South African and the German legal 
systems have a remedy in common in an action for defamation. They all 
acknowledge the remedy of an injunction or interdict in order to restrain the 
defamatory publication. Furthermore the German law recognise a remedy which is 
called the "Unterlassungsklage" to restrain further harm if such harm is imminent. 
8.0 FINAL CONCLUSION 
In sum, it can be concluded that differences as well as similarities exist between the 
Canadian, the South African and the German legal systems in dealing with the law of 
defamation. Although the article has demonstrated that each legal system has its 
advantages and disadvantages, one cannot draw the conclusion that one legal system 
is preferable to the others. Also, it cannot be concluded that, although the Canadian 
and the South African legal systems are based on the common law and the German 
law reflects civil law principles, the different legal background is the reason for the 
existence of these differences. To a certain extent the German law is more similar to 
the South African law than it is to the Canadian law. 
All three legal systems seek to provide a protection for possible violations of an 
individual's reputation. Compared to the Canadian and the South African legal 
systems the German law of defamation provides a broader protection by aiming at the 
protection of a person's personality with all its various aspects such as honour, dignity 
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and privacy. Another difference between the Canadian and the South African legal 
systems and the German legal system is in the protection of the personality of 
deceased persons. The German law acknowledges a personality right "postmortem" 
whereas both the Canadian and the South African legal systems only give the relatives 
of a deceased person a right to sue in an action for defamation if the defamatory 
words, which concern the deceased person, also reflect upon the living. Also, the 
criteria for defamatory words or conduct to be applied in order to have a successful 
claim in a defamation action are different. The Canadian law provides various 
definitions of defamation, the South African law requires the elements of 
"unlawfulness" and "animus injuriandi" for a successful claim and the German law 
distinguishes between three different spheres of protection. All of these different 
criteria illustrate how difficult it is for each legal system to deal with the vague term 
of defamation. 
One of the maJor differences between the South African and the German legal 
systems on the one hand and the Canadian system on the other is the principle of 
liability in an action for defamation. Under German and South African law a fault 
element is required in an action for defamation whereas the Canadian law of 
defamation is regarded as a strict liability tort. The fact that the Canadian law does 
not require a fault element presumably means that it is easier for a Canadian plaintiff 
to have a successful action because the defendant will not be heard with the argument 
that he did not intend to defame the plaintiff Another difference is the fact that the 
Canadian legal system, as opposed to the German and the South African legal 
systems, distinguishes between an action for libel and an action for slander. As a 
consequence of this distinction, damages are presumed in an action for libel or slander 
per se whereas in an action for slander the plaintiff has to prove special damages. 
Both the German as well as the South African legal systems do not recognise a 
difference between an action for libel and for slander. 
Apart from these differences the article demonstrates that all three legal systems also 
have some similarities in dealing with the law of defamation. All three legal systems 
acknowledge a title to sue for legal entities. Furthermore, the defences of absolute 
privilege for parliamentarians, the qualified privilege of exercising a legitimate 
interest, the fair comment and the consent are recognised in all three legal systems. 
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Finally, the Canadian, the South African as well as the German legal system provide 
two basic remedies in a defamation action, the injunction or interdict to restrain the 
defamatory publication and the computation of damages. 
